CHESTERFIELD WFA

Newsletter and Magazine issue 46

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Welcome to Issue 46 - the October 2019 Newsletter and Magazine of Chesterfield WFA.

Our speaker at the October meeting on Tuesday 1st is Rod Arnold. Rod will talk about The **Battle of Dogger Bank** a naval engagement on 24 January 1915, between squadrons of the British Grand Fleet and the German High Seas Fleet. The British had intercepted and decoded German wireless transmissions, gaining advance knowledge that a German raiding squadron was heading for Dogger Bank and ships of the Grand Fleet sailed to intercept the raiders. The British surprised the smaller and slower German squadron, which fled for home. During a stern chase lasting several hours, the British caught up with the Germans and engaged them with long-range gunfire.

The Branch meets at the Labour Club, Unity House, Saltergate, Chesterfield S40 1NF on the first Tuesday of each month. There is plenty of parking available on site and in the adjacent road. Access to the car park is in Tennyson Road, however, which is one way and cannot be accessed directly from Saltergate.

Grant Cullen – Branch Secretary

Western Front Association Chesterfield Branch – Meetings 2019

Meetings start at 7.30pm and take place at the Labour Club, Unity House, Saltergate, Chesterfield S40 1NF

January	8th	**Jan.8th** Branch AGM followed by a talk by **Tony Bolton** (Branch Chairman) on the key events of the first year after the Armistice.
February	5th	Making a welcome return to Chesterfield after a gap of several years is **Dr Simon Peaple** who will discuss the `**Versailles Conference of 1919**`
March	5th	A first time visitor and speaker at Chesterfield Branch will be **Stephen Barker** whose topic will be the `**Armistice 1918 and After**`
April	2nd	No stranger to the Branch **Peter Hart** will be making his annual pilgrimage to Chesterfield. His presentation will be **"Aces Falling: War Over the Trenches 1918"**
May	7th	**John Beckett** Professor of English Regional History, Faculty of Arts at the University of Nottingham -` **The Chilwell Explosion Revisited**`
June	4th	**Rob Thompson** - always a popular visitor to Chesterfield Branch. We all tend to think of recycling as a `modern` phenomenon but in **Wombles of the Western Front**- **Salvage on the Western Front**` Rob examines the work of salvage from its small beginnings at Battalion level to the creation of the giant corporation controlled by GHQ.
July	2nd	In Prof. **John Bourne** we have one of the top historians of The Great War and he is going to talk about `***JRR Tolkein and the 11th Lancashire Fusiliers on the Somme***`
August	6th	'**Making the Armaments Centre of the World: Sheffield 1860-1914**' Dr. Chris Corker - University of York. The role Sheffield played in munitions production during the Great War is somewhat legendary. This talk examines some of the great names in the history of Sheffield steel in the build up to the war.
September	3rd	Back with us for a second successive year is **Dr Graham Kemp** who will discuss `***The Impact of the economic blockade of Germany AFTER the armistice and how it led to WW2***`
October	1st	Another debutant at the Chesterfield Branch but he comes highly recommended is **Rod Arnold** who will give a naval presentation on the `***Battle of Dogger Bank - Clash of the Battlecruisers***`
November	5th	Chairman of the Lincoln Branch of the WFA, **Jonathan D`Hooghe**, will present on the ***" 7th Sherwood Foresters - The Robin Hood Rifles"***
December	3rd	Our final meeting of 2019 will be in the hands of our own **Tim Lynch** with his presentation on ***" One Hundred Years of Battlefield Tourism"***

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CHESTERFIELD WFA BOOK GROUP

By Peter Harris

As a book group we have tried to read a fairly wide range of books rather than repeatedly reading battle histories. We have read general overviews such as Travers's 'How the War was Won', unit histories such as 'The Journey's End Battalion' by Michael Lucas, local history as 'Derbyshire in the First World' by Scott Lomax and about Australian and New Zealand nurses in 'ANZAC Girls' by Peter Rees. This month we returned to more complex subjects as we read 'Artillery in the Great War' by Paul Strong and Sanders Marble.

Our next read is a bit of an experiment. On the 15th October we will be discussing a set of four short academic papers that I have come across at Wolverhampton. These are:-

Jonathan Krause, 'Ferdinand Foch and the Scientific Battle', *The RUSI Journal*, 159.4, (2014) pp. 66-74

Jim Beach, 'Issued by the General Staff: Doctrine Writing at British HQ, 1917-1918', *War In History* 19(4) (2012) pp. 464-491

Jonathan Boff, 'Combined Arms during the Hundred Days Campaign, August –November 1918', *War in History* 14(4) (2010) pp. 459-478

Paul Harris & Sanders Marble, 'The Step by Step Approach: British Military Thought and Operational Method on the Western Front, 1915-1917, *War in History* 15(1) (2008) pp. 17-42

These papers cover a range of topics that I hope will be of interest and give the group an insight into how academics approach a particular topic for study. These papers have now been circulated to all with whom we in contact with – if you haven`t received a copy and would like a copy, please advise the branch secretary on grantcullen@hotmail.com

Next Book discussion Group Meeting – Tuesday 15th October ay 7pm

A Personal Note from the Chair (37)

One of the more recent debates within the WFA has been whether to support more commemorative monuments both at home and in France and Belgium. This mirrors debate in those countries whether after one hundred years and the passing of the generation directly involved if the time has come to 'move on'. I think at least in part this has been exacerbated by some recent monuments that have, let us say, limited general acceptance. In this country I am often surprised to find monuments in some very out of the way places, I think I mentioned in an earlier *Notes* those on Lakeland Peaks.

I was out walking last week when I came across one such monument and although unusually it does not commemorate the First World War I thought it was worth while bringing it to your attention for several other unusual features. As you can see it is a Second World War Memorial only, it also rather unusually commemorates men of the 5th Staffs Leek Battalion of the Home Guard, who fell serving in other units presumably after service in the Home Guard. The monument is fixed to the Trig Point on the 489m (1640ft) Merryton Low overlooking Tittesworth Reservoir in the Staffordshire Moorlands. For anyone with an interest the grid ref is 042630.

General Booth of Salvation Army fame may have claimed that 'the devil has all the best tunes' but to paraphrase I believe our best views are in many cases also home to some fine monuments fitting commemoration to those who fell in both wars and in the case of the monument at Matlock's Pic Tor also those who fell in later conflicts.

The time may have come when new monuments are facing restrictions but we can still recognise the impressive locations of many existing monuments, 'We will remember them'.

Tony Bolton **Branch Chair**

Secretary`s Scribbles

Welcome to issue 46 of the WFA Chesterfield Branch Newsletter and Magazine.

First a word of apology for the misunderstanding last month between myself and our speaker which meant that Graham Kemp didn`t make it to the meeting. We have to book speakers a year (or more) in advance and across the months the date/day got mixed up . Graham will be joining us to make his presentation in February next year – promise!

For our October 2019 meeting on Tuesday we have a naval topic, something of a rarity at our Chesterfield meetings but I am sure that `*The Battle of Dogger Bank - Clash of the Battlecruisers*` will be of interest.

This presentation is by Rod Arnold, who comes well recommended. Rod was born in Aston, Birmingham in 1947 and attended the local King Edward VI Grammar School until age 16. He subsequently obtained various professional qualifications related to his career in the public sector, where he worked in a series of administrative, technical and senior personnel management roles until his retirement in 2007. Rod joined the Western Front Association in 1999 and was a founder member of the Wessex Branch in 2003. He is currently the Branch Vice-Chairman. Rod has contributed to a number of local multi-agency projects to commemorate the Centenary of the First World War including presenting talks to a number of local organizations. He "passed through" Solihull, Luton and Liverpool during his career and now lives in Bournemouth with Margaret, his wife of over 50 years. They have two daughters, two grandchildren and one great-granddaughter.

This time of the year is always a busy time as we finalise our speakers for the forthcoming year – particularly as I want to get a note off to Ralph Lomas who will be putting together the next issue of `Bulletin` which will have, at least, our opening `fixtures` for 2020.

We are also planning on having a branch outing next year, probably in April, to the old WW1 training grounds on Cannock Chase as well as the interesting cemeteries around that area. Those of you who came on the last `outing` a year ago will know what great day out it was, hopefully we can create a good itinerary which will interest our members. Once we have all the details to hand we will seek to determine the level of interest. As with the trip to Lincoln, transport costs etc, will be covered by the Branch – it`s our way of saying `thank you` for your continued support.

As many of you know, I am an active member of the Royal British Legion and for my sins I have been appointed Poppy Appeal Organiser for Worksop RBL. I deputised in this last year but now hold the post on its own.

I look forward to seeing a good turn out on Tuesday evening – see YOU there !!

Grant Cullen – Branch Secretary

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Any opinions expressed in this Newsletter /Magazine are not necessarily those of the Western Front Association, Chesterfield Branch, in particular, or the Western Front Association in general

The Western Front Association's 2020 calendar is now available for pre-order. Once again it features images of the battlefield taken by a team of volunteer photographers. It includes a bit of a Canadian theme this year The scenes depict points of interest in France and Belgium (and, incidentally, Italy, not forgetting Cobbers image to The 5th Australian Division, and the Vancouver Corner image to commemorates the Canadian 1st Division, there is also reference to Canadians on the Courcelette British Cemetery text) ditto to New Zealand because of what is written in February) some of which are well known but others 'off the beaten track'.

As well as providing superb images of a dozen views of the First World War battlefields, the calendar provides detailed commentary to each image helping to set the scene in context.

This is a high-quality product which, every year, receives superb feedback. The sales of the calendar also assist the WFA to continue its work.

The WFA's 2020 calendar is available via **the WFA e-shop** or by phone on 0207 118 1914.
The URL for the calendars on the Eshop is here http://www.westernfrontassociation.com/shop/wfa-branded-items/wfa-calendar-2020/

If you prefer to order by post just complete the order form accompanied by a cheque (details on the form) the URL for this is
file:///H:/WFA/(2)%20Branded%20Goods/(15)%20Calendar%202020/calendar%20leaflet%202020%20(1).pdf

The calendars can be ordered NOW

It is clearly the case that members like to see the calendar images first before they purchase the calendar'
These images can be seen in this URL .
file:///H:/WFA/(2)%20Branded%20Goods/(15)%20Calendar%202020/Calendar,%20Final%20Images%20.pdf
Of course Orders in addition to (as stated here) may be made over the telephone to Sarah in WFA Head Office, please ring 0207 118 1914, with credit card details to hand, or purchase on the Eshop , the Eshop link is under, you can purchase at the Branch for the same price of £10,and when purchased at branch), £5 is retained at branch level and £5 sent to the WFA.

The calendars are now available for dispatch .

Just a few images here, but if you click on the link all images are there, all 13 of them,

Above: May 2020 - Prowse Point Military Cemetery (photo: John White)

Above: November 2020 - Sacrario Militare Del Monte Grappa (photo: Jonathan Dyer)

Above: April 2020 - Vancouver Corner (photo: Steve Kerr)

As some of you may remember, WFA member Robert Illett reported earlier this year that the Hardwick Village Great War Memorial in Clumber Park, North Nottinghamshire had been badly vandalised and the bronze plaques had been stolen – probably to be broken up and sold as non ferrous scrap.

I am happy to report that the National Trust and the local authority have had the plaques replaced.

September Meeting

Edwin Astill opened the meeting by speaking Binyon`s Exhortation. Branch chair, Tony Bolton then advised members that due to an unfortunate mix up over days/dates our scheduled guest speaker Graham Kemp would not be appearing. His visit will be rescheduled for early next year. Tony said that following some last minute phone calls, there would be two presentations, first by himself, an overview of the strategical developments of 1915 and this would be followed by Grant Cullen making a presentation on Gallipoli, based upon his visit to those battlefields two years ago.

Tony opened by saying that the Centenary Events of the First World War ended last year but the media's interest span is limited and the Centenaries have faded from the screens but he would talk about 1915 a largely neglected year of the war. Coming as it did after the initial excitement of the outbreak had settled into the trench lines stretching from Switzerland to the sea that was to become the defining feature of the war.
Tony suggested in fact 1915 was an immensely important year of the war, a year when the difficulty of successful attacks against entrenched machine guns and heavy artillery were fully appreciated and the steps towards finding a solution were tentatively grasped. It was an interregnum year, the Old Contemptibles of Britain's small pre-war Regular Army, with its '15 rounds a minute' had, like all old soldiers, as the saying goes, simply faded away in the bitter fighting around the iconic Belgium town of Ypres. The mass of volunteers had yet to be trained, equipped and assembled into Kitchener's New Army which was to be bloodied on the Somme in 1916. The army of 1915 was the last remnants of the old army drawn from the far flung outposts of Empire; it was also the weekend soldiers of the Territorial Army supplemented by contingents from the Empire, Canada, India, Australia and New Zealand.

1915 was a year of shortages, if the army needed it in 1915, it was short of it, whether that was shells, heavy guns, trench mortars, hand grenades or even warm clothing.
The question of why Britain did not manage a major breakthrough at Neuve Chapelle, Aubers Ridge, Festubert or Loos is not as pertinent as; how the hell did we manage to launch attacks at all. And of course in 1915 there was Gallipoli.

1915 was above all the year when Britain came to understand what it meant to be fighting as part of a coalition.

The year opened in the West with the German Army in occupation of almost all of Belgium and large swathes of northern France including France's important coal mining and industrial regions. True, at the battle of the Marne and at Ypres the German's had been prevented from gaining their strategic objective of defeating France 'before the leaves fall', but for France and therefore also for her 'junior' partner Britain this set the scene for the remainder of the war. France for necessity and for national self- esteem had no alternative other than to attempt to drive the German Army from her soil.

French losses in 1914 had been horrendous 40% of France's total Great War casualties had already been suffered by the start of 1915.For Britain there dawned a real fear that France would seek a separate peace and therefore even if her means were inadequate and the resulting losses fully anticipated she was obliged to support the French offensives of 1915.France too was shackled to the obligations of coalition, Germany's tactical defence in the West allowed her to transfer troops east, threatening to overwhelm the Russians. It was vital to keep Russia in the war and the price had to be paid by the troops on the ground.

The huge advantage that the German Army on the Western Front possessed at the start of 1915 was the flexibility to give ground and site their defences on the most formidable

positions. A tactic which they used throughout the war. If their trenches could be overlooked or enfiladed they simply pulled back to better ones, for the French to give any further ground was an anathema, Britain was hung by the same petard.

It is quite wrong to believe what Tony called ` the Blackadder view` that implies that all British attacks of the war foundered in the mud of no-man's land and the barbed wire of German front line trenches. By 12 March 1915, the three day battle of Neuve Chapelle was drawing to a close. Ammunition shortages had necessitated a short but intense artillery barrage by the 340 guns assembled from across the front. One gun for every 6 yards giving a density of artillery which was not repeated until much later in the war and which allowed British and Indian troops to occupy the village and make reasonable advances against what by later war standards were light German defences. There had been no 'breakthrough', the cavalry waited in vain but Neuve Chapelle taught many lessons.

Unfortunately, without the benefit of hindsight the correct lessons are not so apparent. The British Army concluded that the attack failed because the 2000 yd frontage had been too narrow, allowing the Germans to shell the attackers from the non engaged flanks rather than to realise that its relative success was due to the density of the guns and the surprise they had achieved. This was to lead to subsequent attacks taking place on a wider frontage and as the number of guns did not significantly increase it led to an inevitable reduction in the density of fire. To compensate, the opening barrage would be fired for longer but this entirely removed the element of surprise in the subsequent failures at Aubers and Festubert. learning lessons, however is not limited to the attacker, Neuve Chapelle gave the Germans a far greater scare than was realised at the time. They knew too well that they had faced the real possibility of a breakthrough and set about deepening their defences with line after line of inter connected trenches.

The real lesson of Neuve Chapelle however was that given sufficient artillery it was always possible to get into the front line trenches however as soon as the attacking troops advanced beyond the range of their own guns they could make little progress and suffered from inevitable German counter attacks.

The almost total lack of communications between the attacking troops and HQ once the action had begun rendered the Generals impotent. Wireless technology was too unreliable and far too bulky to be advanced with the troops; telephone wires run out behind the advancing troops were destroyed by enemy shells meaning that communication was reliant on runners. It took hours for runners to get news back to HQ even if they survived the journey and it was by no means certain that the information carried was accurate for anything other than the immediate area from which it had been sent. It has been argued that Generals of The Great War were far less able to influence the course of a battle than Wellington a hundred years earlier .Generals fell back upon increasingly complex prearranged plans and have frequently been criticised when they inevitably failed to cater for every eventuality and delay. The ability to take initial objectives coupled with the inability to communicate led to the development of what was known as 'bite and hold' tactics but these were never going to break though the lines, at best they were a useful means of attrition but this too was countered by new German tactics of holding the front line very thinly and counter attacking when the attacking waves had lost momentum. It is difficult to learn lessons when the enemy keeps changing his tactics.The German Army surprised the Allies again at Ypres on April 22. Defying the Hague Convention they launched Chlorine gas for the first time on the Western Front, the Germans were almost as surprised by its effects on the unfortunate French Algerian division as the Allies and failed to capitc1lize on the success. When they tried again a few days later against the Canadians the time had been well spent and rudimentary masks, cotton pads wetted often by urine offered some protection and the shock of the unknown had passed.

Britain rushed into production of our own gas weapons and by September at the Battle of Loos, gas was used with mixed success to help offset the shortage of guns. At Loos there was one gun for every 141 yards of front, this compared very unfavourably with Neuve Chapelle earlier in the year where it had been one gun every 6 yards. Even so, partly assisted by the gas, some of the initial attacks succeeded in breaching the enemy front lines but the increased frontage of the attack had consumed the reserve divisions which were to exploit the initial success. Sir John French the Commander in Chief of the BEF was slow to release his GHQ Reserve forces and was blamed for the failure. This and his subsequent mendacity proved to be the final straw for Sir John who was replaced by Douglas Haig.

It was at Loos that the 46 North Midland Division our local Territorial division containing the Sherwood Forrester's territorial's from Wirksworth, Matlock and Ashbourne were first engaged. The attack on the Hohenzollern Redoubt was a failure and the Lincoln`s in particular suffered very heavy casualties. Quite unfairly the division was criticised and he was shunted off to the Middle East and its commander, General Sir Stuart Wortley became a marked man.
As early as January 1915 the difficulties of defeating Germany by frontal attacks on the Western Front, what Churchill called 'chewing barbed wire' were already evident. The army in France was condemned to start the painful development of what modern historians have termed the 'learning curve' which was eventually to find the answers to unlocking the front but within Asquith`s Liberal Government thoughts were turning to the idea of 'a way round', if tactically France offered no flanks that could be turned was there an opportunity for a strategic flank attack?
The result was the Gallipoli campaign, initially envisaged by Churchill as an effective use for the many older battleships which could no longer find a place in the Grand Fleet, it grew by degrees into a fully fledged amphibious assault with the aim of pushing the fleet through the narrow waterway of the Dardanelles to Istanbul when it was confidently expected that the threat from the naval guns would cause Turkey to capitulate. It was never clear what the fleet would do to Istanbul if the Turks refused to surrender but of course it was never to come to that.

Peter Hart`s book on the campaign calls Gallipoli 'a lunacy that never could have succeeded'. Despite the undoubted brilliance of the idea behind it and the very real benefits which would have accrued from its success, there were neither the troops, the training nor the resources to achieve that success. One is reminded of the saying (If wishes were horses then beggars would ride). When in Britain, Kitchener's volunteers were dying of pneumonia because there were insufficient tents to protect them from the winter weather and the army in France had to limit the number of rounds that could be fired each day, the idea of opening a new front was indeed lunacy. Much has been made of the appalling lack of secrecy about the intended attacks which were common knowledge in the Cairo bazaar, the navy had flagged its intentions with preliminary raids but in reality the venture relied on ideas of racial superiority and the entirely misconceived belief that the Turks would run rather than fight. It has to be said that there was some evidence for this idea from Mesopotamia but the figure of Mustapha Kemal, later Kemal Ataturk, galvanised the defenders.

Gallipoli became a byword for cock-up. It has been appropriated by Australia for whom it is seen as a building block of nationhood, the myths surrounding it are numerous. Mel Gibson's eponymous film perpetuated many of the myths and even created some new ones. In fact there were more French soldiers on Gallipoli than Australians and British troops far outnumbered both. It may not be surprising that many of the most vocal proponents of the 'bungler and butcher' school of First World War history are Australian. Troops on Gallipoli faced exactly the same problems of crossing a no-man's land dominated by machine guns and

artillery as those on the Western Front but they had even less supporting artillery. Their remarkable retirement from Gallipoli was a faint glimmer in an otherwise bleak story.

For Churchill Gallipoli became a nightmare of bodies washing up on the beaches which influenced his strategy in a later war, as well as effectively denting his political career. When Asquith in May 1915 realised he would have to form a coalition government with the Unionists, their opposition and the perception that he had over ruled military advice in pursuit of personal fame forced him from the Admiralty. In reality the responsibility was not his alone. In the reorganisation Lloyd George became Minister of Munitions and oversaw a dramatic increase in shell production, quantity if not necessarily quality as Britain moved towards a total war footing.

Partly to offset the loss of prestige that the withdrawal from Gallipoli involved, Asquith's coalition government sanctioned the ill fated advance on Baghdad that ended, as I said last year in further ignominy
1915 saw the war spread further as Bulgaria after much diplomatic wrangling finally threw in her lot with Germany and Italy joined the allies without significantly adding to their capability.

Although 2,500,000 men had volunteered by the end of 1915 it wasn't enough, by October the Government was obliged to introduce the Derby Scheme, a political expediency which only delayed for a few months the introduction of conscription so long opposed by the Liberals in the coalition government.

Although no one at the time fully realised its significance, 1915 also saw the birth of an idea which was to help unlock the battlefield and once again Churchill was involved. The problem of crossing the fire zone led to many bizarre suggestions. In June 1915 a paper by Ernest Swinton on caterpillar tracked machine gun destroyers landed on the desk of Sir John French the much derided commander of the BEF who without ever having seen even a prototype realised the potential and immediately wrote to the War Office enthusiastically supporting the development of what of course became the tank. Development and manufacturing time meant that he had been replaced by Haig long before the first tanks reached France in September 1916 but it exemplifies 1915, the year when the British Army began the long and painful development into the victorious army of 1918.

1915 then despite the failures on the Western Front and the abandonment of the strategic alternative in the east saw by the year's end the army markedly better supplied with the means to develop the lessons learned. There were however worrying strains in coalition partners which meant that Kitchener's New Army began to deploy to France and the road was paved to the Somme. But that is 1916`s story.

The second presentation of the evening was by Branch Secretary, Grant Cullen - **Gallipoli – A Turning Point**

Grant opened by saying that all of us are aware of `Gallipoli` - a Great War campaign which seems to encapsulate the futility and waste of the conflict. However, much of what we think we know – or certainly at least, the general public, is down to the 1981 film of that name starring Mel Gibson where the climax to the film is the disastrous attacks in August 1915 by the Australian 10th Light Horse (dismounted cavalry) who charge across open ground at The Nek to be cut down en masse by fire from the Turkish trenches. Grant was fortunate to have the opportunity to visit Gallipoli in September 2017 and see for himself and study the land on which these battles took place over 100 years ago.

The correct name for this campaign is actually the Dardanelles Campaign as the whole point was to open the Dardanelles waterway so that Allied naval ships could get through into the Sea of Marmara and take out the Ottoman (Turkish) navy. It was considered that this show of force off Constantinople (now modern Istanbul) would prompt the capitulation of the Turkish government, thereby opening the sea route into the Black Sea, to support Russia with war materials and allow Russia to export grain to help pay for its war effort. Attacking the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Germany`s principal ally, through Bulgaria and Roumania was also a consideration. If this was done successfully it was considered that the war could be brought to a conclusion, thereby ending the bloody stalemate on the Western Front.

As we know all this failed and quite apart from the naval and military shortcomings, in Grant`s opinion we can actually trace the beginnings of this failure back to November 1914. On October 31st 1914, Turkey formally allied itself with Germany. Five days later a British naval squadron bombarded Turkish positions at the entrance to the Dardanelles killing more than 80 Ottoman soldiers. This Grant believed, was the first turning point as it clearly flagged up to the Turks and their German military advisors that at some stage forcing a passage through the Dardanelles was to be an Allied strategy. As a result of this single brief attack the Turks moved to strengthen their defensive capabilities against further Allied naval attempts to force the straits which was to prove insurmountable for the warships and resulted in the land campaign.

Grant said there was not time to discuss the political machinations in London involving Prime Minister Herbert Asquith, Minister of War Lord Kitchener, First Lord of the Admiralty Winston Churchill, First Sea Lord Jackie Fisher and others but it was decided to send a naval task force, composed mainly of older, expendable pre-dreadnought battleships to the Mediterranean, neutralise by naval gunfire the Turkish positions on both sides of the Dardanelles and thereby force a passage of the Dardanelles by a naval taskforce consisting of ships of the Royal Navy, French and Russian navies through into the Sea of Marmara and lay siege to Constantinople.

Probing warship attacks took place from February 1915 but the Turks seemed adept at quickly repairing damaged fortifications and guns – they also brought in mobile howitzer batteries whose plunging fire damaged a number of the bombarding warships.



Conversely, it has to be said that the low trajectory naval guns were not particularly effective in reducing the forts, the walls of some of these being 12 feet thick!



On March 18th 1915 a strong force of British and French warships moved into the Dardanelles, unaware that the previous night a small Turkish minelayer, the Nusret had laid additional mines parallel to the eastern shore at the point where the warships normally made their turn. During its turn, the French battleship Bouvet struck a mine and blew up. She was quickly followed by HMS Inflexible, HMS Irresistible and HMS Ocean, which although none sank immediately were all seriously damaged. The task force withdrew and Admiral de Robeck informed London that he was not prepared to lose any more ships and that he was calling off the naval attempts to force a passage.
This again constitutes a turning point. Indeed March 18th each year is celebrated by Turkey as the `Cannakale Campaign Day`.
Plans were then put in place to land troops occupy the peninsula and neutralise the batteries which were preventing the warships making safe passage.

This took time.

The Ottoman Army and their German military advisors under the command of General Liman von Sanders knew that a landing of troops would be the next step and poured men and materials into the area, dug additional trenches and other defensive positions in the most likely places where soldiers would come ashore.

They had five weeks to prepare.

Landings took place on April 25th 1915 at five locations on the Gallipoli peninsula whilst a diversionary landing by French forces took place at Kum Kale on the Anatolian (Asian) side of the Dardanelles.

Landings were made at three beaches on the peninsula, British in the south at Helles, the Anzacs at Ari Burno (Anzac Cove), both on April 25th. As these first landings had made little progress, further landings around Suvla Bay on took place on August 6th. The idea was to advance across the peninsula and take the forts and gun positions in the rear.



The landing beaches around Helles were all given letters `S`, V`, `W`, `X` and `Y`.

This following picture was taken from the Turkish positions overlooking V Beach and shows the reconstructed trenches. It clearly shows how they could dominate the landing ground below.

It was on V beach that the tramp steamer, SS River Clyde which had been hastily converted into a landing ship was run aground with the troops emerging from holes cut into the sides of the ship. Despite this many were cut down by the fire from the Turkish defenders as they encountered thick belts of barbed wire which trapped them on the narrow strip of sand on the beach. Amazingly, after the war the River Clyde was refloated, repaired and plied her trade in the Mediterranean until finally being scrapped in the 1960s

In the middle distance of the picture can be seen V Beach Cemetery where so many of those who died on that morning are buried.

The Landing on the 25th had ended in chaos but early next morning Lt. Col Charles Doughty-Wylie armed only with a walking stick led a charge uphill through the village and after vicious house to house fighting the hill (Hill141) was taken by the cheering, charging soldiers. At the moment of his triumph Doughty-Wylie was killed by a sniper. He was buried on the spot by his men. So respected was he by the Turks that his is the only lone marked grave on Gallipoli. He was subsequently awarded a posthumous Victoria Cross.

V Beach Cemetery was created on the site of what had become a casualty clearing station it contains 196 named graves and 480 graves of those whose identification could not be made.

Catholic Padre of the Royal Dublin Fusiliers, Rev. William Finn was killed during the landings and is buried here. Despite his mortal wounds Fr. Finn crawled amongst the wounded and dying giving absolution until he too succumbed.

`W` Beach or `Lancashire Landing` Beach was one of the three allocated to 29th Division on 25th April 1915, and is arguably the most famous of them all. It was here the 1st Lancashire Fusiliers came ashore, and won 'six VCs before breakfast'. W Beach differed from the other beaches used that day, in that it was almost a cove, with an arc of high ground and a long, open beach.

German advisors attached to the Turks had helped in constructing the defence of this position, and redoubts had been placed on the heights with inter-locking fields of fire, wire in the shallow water and mines. They considered it almost impregnable from any sort of landing by small boats. 1st Lancashire Fusiliers, came ashore in companies. About 50 yards from the beach, the boats were unhitched from the tows and they were rowed in. As the boats got nearer to the shore a tremendous fire was laid down by the Turks, causing heavy casualties. Men jumped out into the water, some drowning under the weight of their gear, others getting caught on the wire. Despite this some men beat their way through the wire and assaulted the trenches in the area of the beach itself.

W beach became known as Lancashire Landing. On the high ground above the beach the `Lancashire Landing` cemetery was made between the landing in April 1915 and the evacuation of the peninsula in January 1916. It contains the graves of over 80 men of the 1st Lancashire Fusiliers who died in the first two days following the landing. There are now 1,237 Commonwealth servicemen of the First World War buried or commemorated in this cemetery. The cemetery also contains 17 Greek war graves.

Helles Memorial. The site for the main British memorial is on a small hill at the southern tip of the peninsula – why here – because it was here that the first landings were made and here that the last soldiers departed during the evacuation. The Helles Memorial serves the dual function of Commonwealth battle memorial for the whole Gallipoli campaign and place of commemoration for many of those Commonwealth servicemen who died there and have no known grave. The United Kingdom and Indian forces named on the memorial died in operations throughout the peninsula, the Australians at Helles. There are also panels for those who died or were buried at sea in Gallipoli waters. 20,936 names are commemorated on this memorial.

REDOUBT CEMETERY.

In March 1922 a Lancashire businessman stepped from a cruise ship onto the shore of the Turkish outpost known as Gallipoli. He was accompanied by a host of other pilgrims, but what made James Duckworth stand out was the fact that he was carrying a bucket of water containing the sapling of an oak tree. More than 95 years later this lone English oak continues to grow in this cemetery. The Lancashire oak tree, commemorates Second Lieutenant Eric Duckworth whose loss inspired a family to plant it, and the amateur soldiers from East Lancashire whose sacrifice it now helps to keep alive – soldiers who were to make history as members of the first ever Territorial Army formation to volunteer for overseas' service. The Cemetery contains 396 graves of those known plus 1282 who remain unidentified.

The landing at Anzac Cove on Sunday, 25 April 1915, known to the Turks as the Arıburnu Battle. The assault troops, mostly from the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps (ANZAC), landed at night on the western side of the peninsula. They were put ashore one mile (1.6 km) north of their intended landing beach. In the darkness, the assault formations became mixed up, but the troops gradually made their way inland, under increasing opposition from the defenders. Not long after coming ashore the ANZAC plans were discarded, and the companies and battalions were thrown into battle piece-meal, and received mixed orders. Some advanced to their designated objectives while others were diverted to other areas, then ordered to dig in along defensive ridge lines.

Although they failed to achieve their objectives, by nightfall the ANZACs had formed a beachhead, albeit much smaller than intended. In places they were clinging onto cliff faces with no organised defence system. The exact number of the day's casualties is not known. The ANZACs had landed two divisions but over two thousand of their men had been killed or wounded. Since 1916 the anniversary of the landings on 25 April has been commemorated as Anzac Day, becoming one of the most important national celebrations in Australia and New Zealand. The anniversary is also commemorated in Turkey, the United Kingdom and Ireland.

Lone Pine Memorial and cemetery – like many on Gallipoli this is a true battlefield cemetery being built over the trenches taken at such cost

A battle raged on this spot between 6th and 10th August. Although the campaign was fought during 1915, unlike the western front, there was little battlefield clearance until early 1919 and by that time many of the remains, which had lain in the open for nearly four years were totally unidentifiable.

The memorial wall at Lone Pine. The Lone Pine Memorial commemorates 4,934 Australian and New Zealand troops killed in the sector but who have no known grave. In addition special memorials commemorate 182 Australian and 1 British soldier thought to be buried in the cemetery but whose graves have not been identified

This cemetery forms the focal point of the official ANZAC Commemorations of 25th April each year. Unfortunately numbers attending have fallen in recent years because of the perceived risks in visiting Turkey.

The memorial panels on this wall and on the central pylon are made from Hopton Wood limestone quarried in Derbyshire

The Nek Cemetery – created after the armistice in 1919 it is virtually a mass grave and contains 4 identified New Zealanders, 1 Australian and 316 unknowns. In February 1919 the Graves Registration Unit found more than 300 of these men lying together in a strip the size of three tennis courts1919

This area was made famous in the film `Gallipoli` where men of the 8th and 10th Australian Light Horse made a forlorn assault on the Turkish lines. The Turkish front line was in the trees just behind the Cross of Sacrifice. The Australian trench was just behind from where the photograph

was taken. The Australians charged across this open ground and were massacred by the Turkish machine guns. They were buried in 1919 where they had fallen – facing the enemy

A view from the Australian trenches at The NEK – looking away north towards Suvla Bay this illustrates the hilly terrain that had to be overcome, with the Turks holding the most commanding heights

Today most people tend to overlook the big part that the French played in the Gallipoli Campaign, focussing on The Anzacs. Above Morto Bay (S Beach) is the rarely visited French Cemetery where all the French dead whose remains were found are buried. There are 2240 identified burials with a further 15000 in mass graves under the central tower. The French had 22000 killed – three times the number of Anzacs

Grant mentioned that he – and he suspected many members - had little knowledge of the commitment – losses – by the French at Gallipoli until Peter Hart`s presentation to the branch on the French at Gallipoli, several years ago

There are few cemeteries containing Turkish dead – they have what are known as `Symbolic` cemeteries with markers showing the names of the fallen – or as they are known in Turkey `martyrs`. There are many commemorative memorials most of which show the famous words of Mustafa Kemal (Ataturk) “I order you not to fight – I order you to die”

In an attempt to break the deadlock further south on the peninsula there were landings at Suvla Bay on the night of 6th and 7th August. Allied Commander Sir Ian Hamilton ordered that speed to take the surrounding High Ground was to be of the essence but local commander Sir Frederick Stopford had his staff downgrade this order to securing a beachhead only and the opportunity was lost.

Suvla Bay

Further inland is Azmak Cemetery where some of the men of the Sandringham Company of the Norfolk Regiment are buried. The film `All the Kings Men` starring David Jason is based on this group of men from the Royal Estate and their subsequent loss

There are a number of museums in the region, the naval museum at Cannakale has a replica of the minelayer Nusret whose mines did so much damage to the Allied warships on March 18 1915. The original `Nusret` has been restored and is in a memorial park in Mersin in S. E. Turkey. The naval museum has a large collection of weaponry and ordnance from the Gallipoli campaign until the present day. The second picture shows replicas of the mines which brought an end to the naval assault.

There is a new museum in the Gallipoli national park `Canakkale Destani` - very state of the art with 11 mini `theatres` which you move through as the story of the war is told – some in cgi – very much from the Turkish perspective. In line with the current political situation in Turkey the last two rooms promote the nationalistic view of modern Turkey. Strangely the big part played by Liman von Sanders and the other German military advisors doesn`t rate a mention, even Mustafa Kemal (Ataturk) is not given the prominence that his actions deserve.

This is the grave of Lt. W.E.G. Niven – that of the actor David Niven`s father

Brigadier General, Thomas, Earl of Longford – the present Lord Longford`s father

Both lie in Green Hill Cemetery

The casualty figures give a good understanding of the losses on all sides

- Australia: 18.500 wounded and missing - 7,594 killed.
- New Zealand : 5,150 wounded and missing - 2,431 killed.
- British Empire (excl. Anzac) : 198,000 wounded and missing - 22,000 killed.
- France : 23,000 wounded and missing - 27,000 killed.
- Ottoman Empire (Turkey) : 109,042 wounded and missing - 57,084 killed.
- Furthermore 1.700 Indians died in Gallipoli, plus an unknown number of Germans, Newfoundlanders and Senegalese.

It has to be said that numbers vary according to source but these figures are about as accurate as can be ascertained

After the failure of the August Offensive, the Gallipoli campaign drifted. Ottoman success began to affect public opinion in Britain, with criticism of Hamilton's performance being smuggled out by Keith Murdock, Ellis Ashmead-Bartlett and other reporters. The possibility of evacuation was first raised on 11 October 1915. Hamilton resisted the suggestion, fearing the damage to British prestige but he was sacked shortly afterwards and replaced by Lieutenant General Sir Charles Monro. Autumn and winter brought relief from the heat but also led to gales, blizzards and flooding, resulting in men drowning and freezing to death, while thousands suffered frostbite, Monro recommended evacuation to Kitchener, who in early November visited the eastern Mediterranean. After consulting with the commanders of VIII Corps at Helles, IX Corps at Suvla and Anzac, Kitchener agreed with Monro and passed his recommendation to the British Cabinet, who confirmed the decision to evacuate in early December.

Despite predictions of up to 30,000 casualties,35,268 troops, 3,689 horses and mules, 127 guns, 328 vehicles and 1,600 long tons (1,600 t) of equipment were removed. As at Anzac, large amounts of supplies (including 15 British and six French unserviceable artillery pieces which were destroyed), gun carriages and ammunition were left behind; hundreds of horses were slaughtered to deny them to the Ottomans. The Ottomans retook Helles after the last man left on January 9th 1916. The Allied campaign was plagued by ill-defined goals, poor planning, insufficient artillery, inexperienced troops, inaccurate maps and intelligence, overconfidence,

inadequate equipment and logistics and tactical deficiencies at all levels. Geography also proved a significant factor. As can be seen from this map the landings achieved little being no more than beachheads



While the Allied forces possessed inaccurate maps and intelligence and proved unable to exploit the terrain to their advantage, the Ottoman commanders were able to utilise the high ground around the Allied landing beaches to position well-sited defences that limited the Allied forces' ability to penetrate inland, confining them to narrow beaches. The campaign's necessity remains the subject of debate, and the recriminations that followed were significant, highlighting the schism that had developed between military strategists who felt the Allies should focus on fighting on the Western Front and those that favoured trying to end the war by attacking Germany's "soft underbelly", its allies in the east.

At the start of his presentation, Grant mentioned turning points – and had highlighted two of these. Further examples – back in the UK Asquith was forced to seek a coalition with his Conservative opposition. To join this coalition, the Conservatives demanded that Winston Churchill be removed from his post as First Lord of the Admiralty as he was being blamed, probably unjustly as the release of cabinet documents in later years seemed to prove, for the debacle. Ultimately Asquith had to stand down in 1916 to be replaced by David Lloyd George. Support for the Russians via the Black Sea failed to materialise and their forces began to fall apart, culminating in the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 which ushered in an era of Communism which subsequently spread to many parts of the globe.

The Turkish military regained prestige and confidence which had been shattered in the Balkan Wars of 1912 and with the rise to prominence of Mustafa Kemal the modern Turkish state was established after the Turkish-Greek War of 1922.

And, of course, Australia and New Zealand gained the confidence to take their place as independent nation states alongside Britain and its Empire.

Perhaps one of the most concise comments to the failure of this campaign can be found in the memoirs of Lord Fisher of Kilverstone, who as Jackie Fisher had been First Sea Lord of the Admiralty at the time of planning the naval assault but had resigned on May 15th 1915 after the land battles commenced.

" First and foremost the blame must rest on our peculiarly inefficient war organisation, whereby an ageing politician (Asquith), a man endowed with many gifts, but whose main training in life had been that of a `party` man with a resultant regard for procrastination and expediency and whose guiding motto was `wait and see`, became the Chairman of the War Council, merely because he happened to be the political leader of the party in power at the declaration of war. This chairmanship should without any shadow of doubt have been held by an energetic man of business who was accustomed to probe matters, without fear or favour.

The second cause for the muddle was that both Lord Kitchener and Mr. Churchill were allowed to state their personal views instead of the council being placed in possession of the considered opinions on the Naval War Staff and HQ Staff at the War Office

Thirdly, views of these two Staff should have been laid before the council by their technical heads – NOT by Lord Kitchener or Mr. Churchill…..

…….there was an inevitable tendency for politicians to conduct the war as if it had merely the case of annual exercises…..war to them had not the same reality that it had for those at sea or in the field. Political shackles bound the organisation of our government in war as it bound its vision in peacetime. Generals and Admirals had been trained for war whereas the Prime Minister on whom the supreme direction of the war rested was supposed to be endowed with knowledge of war and war conditions, and with no previous training, to be capable of conducting a world-wide struggle of supreme importance to the Empire.

The result was muddle and disaster and the greatest of our failures was the Dardanelles campaign."

With the presentations over, there was a brief Q & A session after which Branch chair, Tony Bolton, advised members of the availability of WFA Calendars for 2020, these are priced at £10, of which half of that charge is retained in Branch funds.

Climbers in Dolomites injured after picking up First World War explosives

Two climbers have been injured after picking up First World War munitions in an abandoned military position high up in the Dolomites of northern Italy. The Spanish climbers, both 21, were at an altitude of around 9,000ft when they noticed an opening in the rock and ice. Inside the cave-like emplacement, they found abandoned ammunition and ordnance, left over from fighting between Italian and Austro-Hungarian forces more than a century ago. One of the climbers picked up some of the munitions and the object exploded in his hands, leaving both him and his companion injured by shrapnel. Climate change is melting glaciers on the highest peaks of the Dolomites and revealing the remains of First World War battlefields, including abandoned military equipment and the skeletons of soldiers.

Austro-Hungarian soldiers in the Dolomites in 1916

Hikers in the area heard the explosion and went to the climbers' aid, calling the rescue services. Alpine rescue volunteers reached them and treated their wounds before carrying them down the mountain on stretchers. They were then taken to a hospital in the town of Trento. Explosives experts from the paramilitary Carabinieri police cordoned off the area and will remove the remaining ammunition.

More than 750,000 Italian soldiers were killed on the Italian front, many of them amid the crags and ridges of the Dolomites. The Italians and Austro-Hungarians engaged in fierce fighting in the mountains, with each side trying to gain advantage by constructing artillery posts, trenches and bunkers higher than the other.The skeletons of two soldiers, believed to have been members of an Austro-Hungarian artillery unit, emerged from the ice in 2012. They were found on the Presena glacier, not far from where the climbers stumbled on the ammunition.

The remains of an Italian soldier were found in 2017, also at around 9,000ft.

STOKES TRENCH MORTAR, 3-INCH, MARK I, FITTED WITH TUBULAR MOUNTING, MARK II.

A BARREL.

B TUBULAR SUPPORTING LEGS.

C BASE PLATE.

D TRAVERSING GEAR.

E ELEVATING GEAR.

F COPPER WASHER.

G BASE CAP.

H STRIKER PIN.

I CANVAS MUZZLE COVER.

J TRIGGER.



Member Ken Bigland found the following article – quite appropriate when our October meeting is our `Naval Warfare` presentation evening

Built-up gun

A **built-up gun** is artillery with a specially reinforced barrel. An inner tube of metal stretches within its elastic limit under the pressure of confined powder gases to transmit stress to outer cylinders that are under tension.[1] Concentric metal cylinders or wire windings are assembled to minimize the weight required to resist the pressure of powder gases pushing a projectile out of the barrel. Built-up construction was the norm for guns mounted aboard 20th century Dreadnoughts and contemporary railway guns, coastal artillery, and siege guns through World War II.

Contents



Diagram illustrating arrangement of components of a built-up gun, in this case the British BL 6-inch Mark IV naval gun of the 1880s.

Background

Velocity and range of artillery vary directly with pressure of gunpowder or smokeless powder gases pushing the shell out of a gun barrel. A gun will deform (or explode) if chamber pressures strain the barrel beyond the elastic limit of the metal from which it is made.[1] Thickness of homogeneous cast metal gun barrels reached a useful limit at approximately one-half caliber. Additional thickness provided little practical benefit, since higher pressures generated cracks from the bore before the outer portion of the cylinder could respond, and those cracks would extend outward during subsequent firings.[2]

Claverino's 1876 treatise on the "Resistance of Hollow Cylinders" was published in *Giornale d'Artiglieria*.[3] The concept was to give exterior portions of the gun initial tension, gradually decreasing toward the interior, while giving interior parts a normal state of compression by the outer cylinders and wire windings.[4] Theoretical maximum performance would be achieved if the inner cylinder forming the rifled bore were compressed to its elastic limit by surrounding elements while at rest before firing, and expanded to its elastic limit by internal gas pressure during firing.[5]

Nomenclature

The innermost cylinder forming the chamber and rifled bore is called a *tube* or, with certain construction techniques, a *liner*. A second layer cylinder called the *jacket* extends rearward past the chamber to house the breechblock. The jacket usually extends forward through the areas of highest pressure, through the recoil slide, and may extend all the way to the muzzle. The forward part of the barrel may be tapered toward the muzzle because less strength is required for reduced pressures as the projectile approaches it. This tapered portion of barrel is called the *chase*. Very large guns sometimes use shorter outer cylinders called *hoops* when manufacturing limitations make full length jackets

impractical. Hoops forward of the slide are called *chase hoops*.[6] The jacket or forward chase hoop may be flared outward in the form of a bell at the muzzle for extra strength to reduce splitting because the metal at that point is not supported on the forward end.[7] As many as four or five layers, or hoop courses, of successively tensioned cylinders have been used.[8] Layers are designated alphabetically as the "A" tube enclosed by the "B" jacket and chase hoops, enclosed by the "C" hoop course, enclosed by the "D" hoop course, etc. Individual hoops within a course are numbered from the breech forward as the B1 jacket, the B2 chase hoop, and then the C1 jacket hoop, the C2 hoop etc.[9] Successive hoop course joints are typically staggered and individual hoop courses use lap joints in preference to butt joints to minimize the weakness of joint locations. Cylinder diameter may be varied by including machined *shoulders* to prevent forward longitudinal movement of an inner cylinder within an outer cylinder during firing. Shoulder locations are similarly staggered to minimize weakness.[10]

Abrupt diameter change steps on the tapered chase indicate the forward extent of external tensioned cylinders.

Assembly procedure

After the tube, jacket, and hoops have been machined to appropriate dimensions, the jacket is carefully heated to approximately 400 degrees Celsius (800 degrees Fahrenheit) in a vertical air furnace so thermal expansion allows the cool tube to be lowered into place. When the jacket is in position, it is cooled to form a tensioned shrink fit over the tube. Then the next hoop (either B2 or C1) is similarly heated so the assembled A tube and B1 jacket can be lowered into position for a successive shrink fit. The assembled unit may be machined prior to fitting a new hoop. The process continues as remaining tubes are heated sequentially and cooled onto the built-up unit until all elements have been assembled.[11] When tensioned wire winding is used in place of a hoop course, the wire is typically covered by an outer tensioned cylinder also called a *jacket*.

Liners

Burning powder gases melt part of the bore each time a gun is fired. This melted metal is oxidized or blown out of the muzzle until the barrel is eroded to the extent shell dispersion becomes unacceptable. After firing several hundred shells, a gun may be reconditioned by boring out the interior and inserting a new liner as the interior cylinder. Exterior cylinders are heated as a unit to approximately 200 degrees Celsius (400 degrees Fahrenheit) to allow insertion of a new liner and the liner is bored and rifled after installation. A new liner may be bored for a different projectile diameter than used in the original gun. Liners may be either cylindrical or conical. Conical liners are tapered toward the muzzle for ease of removal from the breech end while limiting forward creep during firing. Conical liners may be removed by water cooling the liner after re-heating the barrel, but cylindrical liners must be bored out.[12]

Monoblock guns

With the obsolescence of very large guns following World War II, metallurgical advances encouraged use of monoblock (one-piece) construction for postwar guns of medium caliber. In a procedure called autofrettage, a bored monoblock tube is filled with hydraulic fluid at pressures higher than the finished gun will experience during firing. Upon release of hydraulic pressure, the internal diameter of the monoblock tube will have been increased by approximately 6%. The outer portion of the finished monoblock rebounds to approximately its original diameter and exerts compressive forces on the inner portion similar to the separate cylinders of a built-up gun.[13]



Emden, *Light Cruiser, launched 1908*

SMS EMDEN

Small Protected Cruiser 1906-1914

by Kapitän zur See Dr Friedrich Forstmeier

Light Cruiser Development up to 1914

The 19th century saw the invention of the Whitehead torpedo, its installation in small fast craft, and, as a counter-measure, the impressive technical progress of gunnery and armour. These developments led to two main types of cruisers: (a) the big, armoured cruiser, designed for reconnaissance, to fight in the line if necessary, to pursue and destroy stragglers and to protect her own damaged ships after battle; (b) the small protected cruiser, fit to fight the torpedo-carrying craft of the enemy, shielding the main body of the fleet against that new, potentially deadly weapon.

The armoured cruiser was to grow considerably in size and armament, eventually ending up in the heavy 'battle cruiser', a type of ship no longer corresponding to the true tasks of a genuine cruiser. The small protected cruiser, afterwards renamed 'Light Cruiser', did not essentially change its characteristics up to 1914.

There remained, however, other important assignments for a nation's cruiser force besides their support or protection of the fleet in a major action at sea. There was the need to represent the national interest abroad in peace-time or, in war-time, to carry out surface raiding activities against the enemy. This made it necessary to have available—in addition to the light cruiser serving as a 'scout' and protecting the fleet from torpedo craft—a specific light cruiser for service abroad. These two completely different missions required the construction of two types of light cruisers: the scout and the raider. The 'fleet cruiser' or *'scout'* had to be sufficiently fast to be able to escape superior pursuers, and it had also to be relatively small in order not to attract the enemy's attention. For the *'raider',* on the other hand, whose mission was to hunt down the adversary's merchantmen and to disrupt his lines of communications at sea, the important qualities were *high endurance* (especially true in the case of Germany which had no naval bases abroad), *heavy machinery,* robust enough to sustain extended periods of operation, and sufficient *fighting power* to stand up against an opponent if discovered—and then to shake her off. With regard to the ever important factor of speed, it was considered adequate if the raider could maintain the average speed of merchantmen.

For many nations, the ideal solution of the 'cruiser question' would have been the construction of these two different types, furnished with all the essentials listed above. For lack of funds, however, almost none was able to accomplish such an ambitious programme. A historical survey reveals that Great Britain alone was in a position to build both types; other nations had to be satisfied with restricting themselves to only one or to a multi-purpose type. For some time the powers were uncertain what type of cruiser was preferable, the decision depending finally on the specific situation of a nation, its politico-strategic aims and, hence, on the composition of the naval forces it could

afford in order to implement its policies.
A critical appreciation of the development of cruiser construction shows that, from 1898 onwards, it was the German Imperial Navy that worked most systematically to produce a uniform cruiser class to meet its needs. Before that time the first cruisers to be constructed (beginning with *Blitz* and *Pfeil,* 1882), the so-called Avisos, were true 'fleet cruisers', i.e., of small displacement (1000 tons) and modest armament (one 4·9in, four 3·4in guns). Unprotected units such as *Arcona* (1885) served abroad, supported by gunboats. The *Gefion* (1893, 4100 tons, 10-4·1in guns, 6500 nautical miles endurance) could be called a genuine 'Auslandskreuzer'. The *Hertha*-class cruisers with displacements up to 5900 tons, two 8·2in, eight 6in guns, could also be classified as 'Auslandskreuzer', as they were without belt armour and were not larger than the contemporary British light cruisers. It was the launching of *Fürst Bismarck* (10,700 tons) in 1897 that ushered in the era of the heavy 'armoured cruiser'.
A fundamental decision in the construction of German light cruisers was made with the launching of the *Gazelle*-class in 1898. The division between 'scout' and 'Auslandskreuzer' was abandoned in favour of a uniform type to meet both requirements: service with the Fleet and service abroad. A remarkably steady building programme was initiated with *Gazelle* (1898, 19 knots, 2650 tons, 10-4·1in guns) to *Leipzig* (1918, 30 knots, 5600 tons, eight 6in guns, three 3·5in guns). Each new ship was in some respects an improvement on its predecessor. The newly commissioned ships were regularly assigned to the High Seas Fleet; and, as soon as they could be replaced by more modern cruisers, they were sent abroad to join the Cruiser Squadron.
The *Emden,* built 1906-1908, holds a midway position in the pre-war development of cruiser construction. She was an exception to the rule in that she was sent, after her final commissioning, directly to the Far East.

SMS Emden—Details of Construction

Emden was laid down on 6 April 1906. She was launched on 26 May 1908, first commissioned on 10 July 1909, decommissioned on 29 September 1909, recommissioned on 1 April 1910 and assigned to the Cruiser Squadron. She left for the Far East by way of South America on 12 April 1910, and arrived at Tsingtao in September 1910. She was built at the Kaiserliche Werft (Imperial Yard), Danzig. Building costs amounted to Reichsmark 5,802,882·85.

Armament

Emden's armament consisted of:
(a) 10-10·5cm (=4·1in) guns singly mounted, with shields. At maximum elevation the range was 12,200m (=13,347·7 yards). The guns were quick-firing, 16 shots per minute. Each was supplied with 150 rounds of high explosive shell;
(b) two (in foreign waters: four) 8mm (0·3in) machine guns, range 2400m (=2624·5 yards), 250 shots per minute, 20,000 (abroad: 40,000) rounds;
(c) *Emden*'s landing party consisted of three 6cm (2·4in) portable guns, with 241 rounds each, and two 8mm (0·3in) machine guns;
(d) The torpedo-armament consisted of two torpedo tubes (broadside), calibre 45cm (17·7in).

Armour

The protection of *Emden* was poor. The decks had an armour plating between 10 and 25mm (0·4in-1in), and the belt-armour was between 80 and 100mm (3·1in-3·9in). The guns were protected by shields of 20/25/50mm (0·8in/1in/2in). The control tower's armour was 30mm (1·2in) at the base, 100mm (3·9in) at the faces; its shield was 80mm (3·1in).

Machinery

Emden was equipped with two vertical triple expansion engines, with three cylinders each, manufactured by the Imperial Yards at Danzig. They delivered approximately 16,171hp at 141rpm. The engines drove two propellers with four blades each. They worked from 12 water tube boilers, having tubes of small bore. *Emden* was fitted with three funnels. Her contract speed was 24 knots, standard cruising speed 12 knots, at which speed the ship had an endurance of 3760 nautical miles.

Details of Construction

Emden was built from Siemens-Martin mild steel (structural steel). Twelve watertight cross bulkheads divided the ship into 13 compartments. On each of the ship's sides was a wing passage bulkhead (coal bunker bulkhead), extending from frame 21 to 74, and from the double bottom up to the armoured deck. Characteristics of the *Emden* were her oblong forecastle, turtle-backed athwartships, and a long poop. The after part of the forecastle carried the conning bridge. Below it the conning tower, forecastle, and poop were connected by means of a bridge.

A Raider's Adventurous Career: July 1914 at Tsingtao

In the summer of 1914 *Emden* had nearly completed her fifth year of service with the Cruiser Squadron. The squadron was assigned to the 'Far Eastern Station' of the Imperial German Navy and consisted, besides *Emden,* of the armoured cruisers *Scharnhorst* (flying the flag of Vice-Admiral Maximilian von Spee) and *Gneisenau,* and the light cruisers *Nürnberg* and *Leipzig.* One torpedo-boat and seven gun-boats, were attached to this force.
In 1913 the command of *Emden* had been conferred on Lieutenant-Commander Karl v. Müller, soon to be promoted to Commander. He had recently served on the staff of the Reichsmarineamt (Imperial Navy Office) and won the high esteem of the naval secretary of state, Grand Admiral v. Tirpitz. It was to develop into a personal relationship that continued on very cordial terms, beyond 1918 until the premature death of Karl v. Müller in 1923 at the age of 50. Müller had joined the navy at the age of 18, as a midshipman in 1891. Although not listed among the first third of his class in the officer examination, he soon became prominent as a most

capable and efficient officer. On board the *Emden* he was the idol of his men because of his profound sense of justice, his quiet, always controlled behaviour, his benevolent attitude towards his inferiors, and his unceasing care for their well-being.

In July 1914 *Emden* was the only cruiser left at the Far Eastern Station. The other ships of the Squadron were cruising in the South Pacific or were en route to change stations. *Leipzig* was to replace *Nürnberg* off the coast of Mexico. Commander v. Müller had been appointed 'Senior Officer' of the Station. In this capacity, he had, in case of mobilisation, to carry out important measures during the Squadron's absence. He was responsible for the solution of the logistical problems of the Squadron. He had to supply his Admiral with relevant information, and to initiate the necessary operations.

Emergency Measures—Outbreak of War

On 31 July, when Müller received the news of an impending war, he immediately took the necessary steps to deal with the emergency. He decided to use *Emden* to harass the Far East sea trade of the Allies, in order to prevent their naval forces concentrating against Tsingtao. Having completed her 'state-of-war-readiness', *Emden* put to sea on the evening of 31 July. On 2 August Müller received news of the outbreak of war with Russia, and on 3 August of that with France. He now made up his mind to sortie into the Korea Strait. Here *Emden* surprised her first victim, the Russian steamship *Rjäsan* (3522 GRT). The ship tried to escape and it was not until after the 12th shot that she surrendered. Müller took her to Tsingtao where he arrived without incident. The *Rjäsan,* a relatively new ship, built by the German

Left: *Fregattenkapitän Karl v. Müller, Captain of* Emden
Below: Emden, *Light Cruiser, launched 1916*





Emden, *Light Cruiser, launched 1925*

Emden, *Fast Frigate of the Federal German Navy, launched 1959*

Schichau Yard, was refitted to serve as an auxiliary cruiser under the Imperial flag.[1]

At Tsingtao the German authorities were busy equipping the colliers and supply ships required for the maintenance of the Cruiser Squadron. Numerous ships had already left to reach appointed rendezvous positions. (Out of a total of nine vessels, five reached the Squadron, one was sunk, the remaining three being seized by British or French forces.)

[1] *Rjäsan* was renamed *Cormoran* and commissioned as an auxiliary cruiser on 7 August 1914. Through lack of fuel she was forced to submit to internment at Guam on 14 December 1914. When, after the entry of the USA into the war, her captain was requested to surrender, he blew up the ship.

The Japanese Attitude—an Unknown Factor

On 5 August the Station received a telegram from the Commanding Admiral of the Cruiser Squadron. It contained the order for *Emden* to join the squadron at Pagan. Accordingly she left Tsingtao in the early morning of 6 August, together with the auxiliary cruiser *Prinz Eitel Friedrich* and the collier *Markomannia*. On her way to Pagan, *Emden* met only Japanese vessels. As the Japanese attitude towards Germany was not yet clear, none of these were stopped. In the afternoon of 12 August *Emden* joined the squadron at Pagan. Commander v. Müller's mission to mobilise the Far Eastern Station for war was completed.



The Officers of the SMS Emden. X *Commander Karl von Müller.* O *Prince Franz Joseph of Hohenzollern, nephew of the Kaiser* *(Published by C. A. Ribeiro & Co Ltd, Singapore (Copyright))*



Dupleix, *French Armoured Cruiser, launched 1900*

A decisive question for Vice-Admiral Count Spee was the attitude of the Japanese Government. Should Japan remain neutral, Spee planned either to lead his squadron to the Indian Ocean to interrupt the British routes, or to venture a break-through to Germany by rounding Cape Horn. Only a couple of days later the Commanding Admiral was forced to revise his plans. By now it had become evident that Japan would side with the Entente powers. Hearing that a Japanese fleet was on its way to the South Pacific, Spee resolved on 13 August to leave Pagan immediately. He thought it useless to sacrifice his ships to a superior force when, as a 'fleet in being', they would be able to harass the enemy. Spee ruled out the Indian Ocean as an operational area because of the complete lack of logistical support facilities. Sailing to the coast of South America would offer opportunities to meet colliers and to replenish at neutral ports. In addition, it was to be expected that Japanese units would not follow thus far.

These were the considerations that Count Spee submitted to his captains on 13 August on board his flagship. He asked them to voice their opinions. It was Müller who put forward his concern about the inactivity to which the squadron would be condemned while crossing the Pacific. For several months it would not be able to inflict damage on the

enemy. This would be detrimental to the future of the navy and to German prestige at sea. He suggested, therefore, detaching at least one light cruiser for warfare in the Indian Ocean. The Admiral was in agreement with this proposal and, in the afternoon, he announced his decision to send *Emden* on this operation, as she was the fastest of his light cruisers. The best collier was to accompany her. At 0700 on 14 August *Emden* turned away from the Squadron and set course for the Palau Islands.

The Strategic Situation in the Indian Ocean

The Indian Ocean offered many opportunities for inflicting losses on Great Britain. Cargoes essential to the survival of Great Britain were carried on its numerous and much frequented shipping lanes from Australia and the Far East to India, and from there to the Suez Canal. In addition, any success by Germany off the coast of India would lower the prestige of Britain in the eyes of the Indian population, a factor which would make them rebellious against their rulers.

With regard to coal supply vital to her operations, *Emden*'s captain was sure that he could rely on his captures. Adequate anchorages for coaling were more numerous in this region than elsewhere. There remained the problem of the enemy's counter-forces. For the time being they were negligible for two reasons: (a) the tremendous extension of the area to be controlled; (b) of all the forces in the British East Indian Station, as they were then known to Müller—battleship *Swiftsure*, light cruisers *Dartmouth* and Fox, and four sloops—only *Dartmouth* was superior to *Emden* in speed and armament. Nor were the three old cruisers of the Cape Squadron a serious threat because of their inferiority in speed. Dangerous adversaries could only come from the British China Squadron, the Australian Squadron and the Japanese Fleet, and eventually from squadrons in the Mediterranean.

The most promising hunting ground in the Indian Ocean was the entrance to the Red Sea, but this area was assigned to SMS *Königsberg* (East African Station). *Emden* would therefore concentrate on the trade routes between Singapore and Colombo, Colombo and Aden (eastern part), the routes in the Bay of Bengal, and Australian-Indian routes.

As Commander v. Müller reflected on these problems, his ship had still a long way to steam before reaching the coveted hunting grounds.

Breaking through to the Indian Ocean

Müller's plan was to remain unobserved and then to descend on the enemy, taking him completely by surprise. For this reason he decided to cross the Malay Archipelago by way of the Molucca and Buru Straits, and the Banda Sea. He therefore steamed east of the Mariana Islands on a southerly course, passing through the northwestern Carolines on 19 August, and then proceeded to Angaur Island via the Palau Islands. *Emden* coaled from *Markomannia* and then resumed her course

HMS Dartmouth, *British Light Cruiser, launched 1911*





HMS Hampshire, *British Armoured Cruiser, launched 1903*



HMS Fox, *British Light Cruiser, launched 1893.* Dupleix *and* Fox *both hunted the* Emden



HMS Swiftsure, *British Battleship, launched 1903*

southwards. On 26 August she met the Dutch battleship *Tromp* off Jampea. As *Tromp's* commanding officer insisted that he had strict orders to prevent a belligerent from staying more than 24 hours in Dutch territorial waters, Commander v. Müller decided to postpone coaling until his arrival off Simalur, and to leave Jampea immediately. *Emden* steered first in the direction of the Makassar Strait and then, when out of sight of the *Tromp*, she altered course to head for the Lombok Strait. During the night *Emden's* wireless operator listened in to lively W/T from a British warship, later identified as the armoured cruiser *Hampshire.*

Fully prepared for battle, *Emden* then made for the passage of the Lombok Strait. Fearing she might be sighted and reported by enemy agents on ships stationed in that area, Müller agreed to the suggestion of his second-in-command, First Lieutenant v. Mücke, to rig up a fourth funnel made from canvas. This gave *Emden* the appearance of a British cruiser.

As *Emden* passed the southern exit of the Sunda Strait, steering a north-westerly course up the coast of Sumatra, her operator continually heard the W/T of a British warship. These calls increased in intensity on approaching Simalur. On the evening of 3 September the enemy's distance was guessed not to exceed 10 to 20 nautical miles. In fact *Hampshire* of Admiral Jerram's squadron, hunting for German forces, had entered the port of Langinni that very day. *Emden* must have crossed *Hampshire's* path during the night—her first narrow escape!

The next day *Emden* proceeded to Langinni anchorage, and started to take in coal from the *Markomannia.* A Dutch officer came on board to see the captain. He demanded the immediate departure of the *Emden* in conformity with the Dutch government's strict interpretation of neutrality. Müller therefore had to abandon his plan of coaling in a quiet bay, and resort to the difficult process of coaling on the open sea. As it was too late to redirect the colliers to new rendezvous stations, Müller knew that from now on he must rely on coal supplies from captured ships.

Cruiser Warfare in the Indian Ocean

Emden reached the Bay of Bengal on 5 September. Since the outbreak of war the movement of shipping had been at a low level, because of the uncertain military situation at sea. Exports shrank to a minimum, the shipping companies keeping their ships in port. The British Admiralty tried to allay the fears of the ship owners and encouraged them to carry on their trade. To protect the shipping routes the battleship *Swiftsure* and the light cruiser *Dartmouth* were posted at the entrance to the Red Sea. The light cruiser *Fox* and the sloop *Espiègle* watched the focal points of trade near Colombo. Three French destroyers accompanied by the gunboat *d'Iberville* were stationed to protect trade passing through the Strait of Malacca. The task of Vice-Admiral Jerram's China Squadron was to safeguard the Indian Ocean against attacks from the east. This force consisted of cruisers *Minotaur, Hampshire, Yarmouth, Dupleix,* and the auxiliary cruisers *Empress of Asia, Empress of Japan,*


Emden raiding Penang 28th October 1914
Emden returns 8am Oct 28th
Emden approaches 3am Oct 28th
Strait of Malacca
George Town
Pulo Penang
MOUSQUET Sunk
ZHEMTCHUG Sunk
approach buoy
INDIA
ARABIAN SEA
BAY OF BENGAL
SOUTH CHINA SEA
Calcutta
Bombay
Madras
Colombo
CEYLON
Rangoon
Port Blair
Andaman Islands
Nicobar Islands
Prepars Islands
Laccadive Islands
Minicoi Islands
Maldive Islands
Chagos Archipelago
Diego Garcia
Simalur
Penang
Singapore
MALAY PENINSULA
SUMATRA
Sunda Strait
JAVA
BORNEO
CELEBES
Makasar
Moluccas Strait
CELEBES SEA
PHILIPPINES
LUZON
MINDANAO
SAMAR
PANAY
Palau Islands
Angaur Islands
MOROTAI
HALMAHERA
CERAM
NEW GUINEA
ARAFURA SEA
TIMOR SEA
AUSTRALIA
FLORES SEA
FLORES
TIMOR
Jampea
Jamdena
Buru
SUMBAWA
SUMBOK
HAMPSHIRE 22 Sept
SWIFTSURE 22 Sept
CHIKUMA 22 Sept
ZHEMTCHUG 28 Oct
IBUKI 22 Sept
EMDEN
6–7 Oct Cruising
16–17 Oct
18 Oct
28 Sept
29–30
H 21 Oct
1 Oct
29 Oct
21 Sept
7 Sept
22 Oct
1 Nov
8 Nov
31 Aug
1 Sept
25 Aug
19 Aug
November 9th
6am at anchor Post Refuge
9.30am anchor up
9.40–11.45am engagement with HMS Sidney
11.15am Emden wrecked
Key
H Hampshire British Armoured Cruiser
Y Yarmouth British Light Cruiser
C Chikuma Japanese Light Cruiser
I Ibuki Japanese Battle Cruiser
S Swiftsure British Battle Ship
A Askold Russian Light Cruiser
X Ship sunk by Emden
Coaling
Cocos Islands (keeling)

Himalaya, and the Japanese cruisers *Ibuki* and *Chikuma.*
When *Emden* came on the scene, shipping in the Indian Ocean had resumed its regular service. Numerous ships were needed for the transport of Indian troops from Bombay and Karachi to Aden. This favoured *Emden*'s plans, as the bulk of the East India Naval Forces were tied up in convoying these transports, thus leaving important routes unprotected.

Marauding in the Bay of Bengal
From 6 September onwards *Emden* cruised on various shipping routes in the Bay of Bengal. On 10 September she altered course to the Colombo-Calcutta route. At 2200 she stopped the Greek collier *Pontoporros* carrying freight for the British government. Müller decided to employ the ship as a collier, and her captain and crew readily agreed to serve under Müller in return for payment.
During the following days *Emden* captured five British vessels. Four were sunk, and the fifth employed to carry the crews of the sunken prizes. *No ship had been able to use its W/T.* On 13 September Müller decided to proceed further to the north to make a check on the Madras-Calcutta route. Next day he released the *Kabinga* with the prize crews on board. He also seized and sank two more British ships. He then proceeded to the Ganges estuary which he reached on 18 September. Off Rangoon *Emden* stopped a Norwegian freighter. The ship carried no contraband goods, but Müller learned from her captain of the presence of Allied warships in the Strait of Malacca and at Penang. Having also overheard W/T traffic relating to *Emden,* Müller thought it wise to leave these dangerous waters and to return, for the time being, to the eastern coast of India.

British Counter-Measures
An Italian ship, searched and released by *Emden,* reported the presence of the German warship to a British steamer who in turn transmitted the message to Calcutta. The news came as a tremendous shock. Immediately all shipping activities ceased and lights were extinguished. As the East India Squadron was busy in escorting troop transports, Vice-Admiral Jerram ordered *Hampshire,* the Japanese light cruiser *Chikuma* and *Yarmouth* to pursue *Emden.* The armoured cruiser *Minotaur* was dispatched to the west coast of Sumatra, and the Japanese cruiser *Ibuki* to the Cocos Islands, as it was thought that *Emden* might use one of these places for coaling.
While *Emden* cruised off Rangoon on 18 September, *Hampshire* steamed east of the Nicobar Islands, to the north, and then proceeded further northward to search False Bay. Finally she steered south towards Madras. *Chikuma,* who had been sent to Ceylon, returned from there to the north, while *Yarmouth* searched the Bay of Martaban. Commander v. Müller had, however, turned westward on 18 September to head straight for Madras.

The Bombardment of Madras
Müller planned to bombard Madras in order to demonstrate to the Indian population the freedom of movement of German warships. This would also cause consternation and would lower the enemy's prestige. During the night of 19/20 September *Emden* passed the Preparis South Canal, and again the *Hampshire*'s W/T was heard close at hand. Indeed *Emden* had once more crossed the British cruiser's path as she came up from Port Blair.
On 22 September at about 2000 *Emden* approached Madras at high speed. Nobody, it seemed, had anticipated the coming of the German raider. Buoys were lit and the lights of the city shone brightly, which materially assisted *Emden*'s navigation. At about 3000 yards from the pier-heads, *Emden* turned her searchlights on the shore, and began to hammer away for ten minutes at the Madras oil tanks. Two went up in flames, three more were hit, several shots damaged a steamer, while others caused insignificant damage in the city. After firing 130 rounds *Emden* left and, steering various courses to mislead observers, she finally turned to the south.
Trade in the Indian Ocean suffered heavily as a result of *Emden*'s exploits. By 23 September, shipping in the Bay of Bengal was again stopped, only twenty-four hours after its resumption: the impact on the Indian population was dramatic.
Good fortune continued to favour *Emden.* On 22 September *Hampshire* was 300 nautical miles north of her, *Chikuma* held a position somewhat to the south, but neither cruiser caught a glimpse of her.

West of Colombo
Originally Commander v. Müller had planned to proceed to Simalur for a rendezvous with colliers. He changed his mind in favour of a cruise west of Colombo, rounding the southern tip of the island on 24 September. The next day *Emden* sank two British steamers, and seized a third on 25 September. Two days later she captured the *Buresk,* a British collier filled with high grade Welsh coal. Müller took her on as a coal supply ship, manning her with a new crew. The same day two more British ships were destroyed.
It was realised in *Emden* that the non-arrival of some ships bound for Colombo would cause suspicion. *Emden* was also in urgent need of refuelling, so Müller thought it best to leave the area and proceed to the Maldive Islands.
Emden's success had further increased the difficulties of the India trade. Her dramatic appearance at one of the gateways to India was, to say the least, disconcerting. The result was that, apart from a few intermittent hours, shipping in the Bay of Bengal had virtually ceased for the period between 14 September and 2 October. The value of exports decreased by 61·2%.

Emden reached the Maldive Islands on 29 September. After having coaled, she left on 30 September in a southerly direction. For two days she cruised on the Australia-Aden and the Mauritius-Calcutta shipping routes. Subsequently she went to Diego Garcia to rest her crew and to carry out repairs.

Burning Oiltanks at Madras after bombardment by Emden ▶

Her Luck Persists

Again *Emden* was extremely lucky; the news of the existence of a state of war between Great Britain and Germany had not yet penetrated to that forlorn outpost. The visiting Germans were treated with the utmost cordiality and they responded in the same way. After a thorough cleaning of the ship's bottom and refuelling, *Emden* left the island at noon on 10 October.

Commander v. Müller intended to renew his hunt in the waters west of Colombo. He sailed on northern courses in the general direction of Minikoi. On 11 October the W/T of *Hampshire* was again heard with increasing intensity. *Hampshire* had looked in vain for *Emden* at the Lakedive and Maldive Islands, and she now correctly guessed her to be in the south. She therefore sailed, on 13 October, for the Chagos Archipelago. Again both cruisers passed each other on opposite courses, 300 nautical miles apart. *Hampshire* learned on 15 October that *Emden* had left. Accordingly the former ship hurried to the north to resume patrolling the waters off Ceylon. At the same time her captain heard further news of the great successes of his German adversary.

West of Colombo Again

At midnight on 15 October *Emden* seized a British ship with a valuable cargo near Minikoi. She was sunk the following morning. The next victim was a British dredger. Up to 20 October five more ships were captured, one of them being despatched with the prize crews. One was employed as a collier and the remaining three were sunk.

After these successes Müller again abruptly left the scene of his actions and on 20 October *Emden* was on an easterly course. In the meantime the British units were making every effort to hunt down the dangerous German raider. On 20 October, *Hampshire* was cruising south of Ceylon, *Yarmouth* stood off Colombo, escorting a convoy of French transports, *Chikuma* watched in the Strait of Malacca, and the Russian cruiser *Zhemtchug* was on her way from Penang to the Maldive Islands looking for possible German coaling bases. In the course of their activities, *Hampshire* came within 25 miles of *Emden,* and the auxiliary cruiser *Empress of Asia* was only 10 miles from the German warship. Only poor visibility prevented the latter from being discovered.

The fact that *Emden* time and again was able to dodge her pursuers caused a great deal of disappointment. The London Times wrote that it was time to ask whether and when the Admiralty intended to stop the bold raids of the *Emden.*

Raiding Penang Harbour

Meanwhile, encouraged by his constant luck, Commander v. Müller, at the suggestion of one of his lieutenants, made up his mind to risk a surprise attack on Penang. He expected to find Allied warships and cargo vessels in the harbour and to play havoc among them. After coaling at Nankuri (Nicobar Islands), Müller sailed for Penang on the night of 28 October, at a speed that would ensure *Emden*'s arrival off Penang at dawn.

From 0300 she approached the harbour at 18 knots, her dummy funnel being rigged to deceive careless observers. Entering the port was facilitated by the fact that all lights including those at the entrance were burning. On approaching the warship anchorage, *Emden*'s attention was caught by four parallel bright lights on the starboard bow. At 1200 yards they were recognized as the quarter-deck lights of a warship. At 800 yards she was made out to be the Russian cruiser *Zhemtchug*.

Manoeuvring his ship into a favourable firing position 300 yards from his target, Müller ordered his torpedo officer to fire at 0518. As soon as the torpedo had left its tube he ordered his armament to open up. The torpedo hit the Russian cruiser below the after funnel. The cruiser's deck was lifted by the explosion and then collapsed. At the same time, *Emden* poured a devastating fire into her victim and soon the sides of the *Zhemtchug* looked like a sieve.

Having passed the Russian cruiser by this time, *Emden* turned full circle. During this manoeuvre a single gun of *Zhemtchug* returned the fire but without scoring a hit. As Müller was not certain that his victim would sink, he ordered a second torpedo to be fired. While his guns again hammered away at his unhappy adversary, the second torpedo hit right

under the bridge. A tremendous explosion followed; the cruiser was torn apart and large fragments were thrown into the air. When the smoke cleared, a masthead was all that remained of *Zhemtchug.*

There is an interesting account of the Penang raid by a Russian sailor published in the 'Siam Observer' of 9 November 1914. He was on the deck of *Zhemtchug* and saw the foreign warship coming into view at 0530. Challenged by the *Zhemtchug,* the foreigner replied, '*Yarmouth* coming to anchor.' One of the guards on board the Russian cruiser who was keeping a close watch on the incoming vessel, noticed the foremost funnel shaking, and he immediately gave the alarm by shouting, '*Emden!*' A shot was fired almost at once at the German ship. This missed its target, and *Emden,* now abreast of her opponent, fired four shells at the Russian, two of which hit.

A torpedo from *Emden* then struck *Zhemtchug* aft, followed by another which exploded in the fore part of the Russian vessel. As she heeled over her guns became practically useless. *Emden* continued on course for a short distance, keeping up a desultory fire, then turned, at the same time firing a broadside. When again abreast *Zhemtchug,* now on the Province side, *Emden* fired another broadside. Because of her heavy list, the Russian cruiser's return fire passed harmlessly over the German. Now in a sinking condition, with her deck covered with dead and wounded men, the ship was completely shattered by a terrific explosion, believed to be the magazine. When the dense mass of flames and smoke cleared, only the top of *Zhemtchug*'s mast was to be seen, while scores of men were struggling in the water.

Regretfully Müller decided to leave as soon as he had finished off the Russian cruiser. He realised that if he stayed longer, he might have to face a superior foe. He therefore returned to the north at high speed. Near the approach buoy he stopped an incoming British steamer. A prize crew was sent aboard, but suddenly an unknown warship, approaching from the north-west, was reported. Müller abandoned his prize ship and, turning towards the oncoming vessel, soon identified her as a French destroyer. The much inferior *Mousquet* put up a brave, but hopeless fight: her destruction was a matter of a few minutes, *Emden* rescuing the survivors.

At about 0800 *Emden* departed on a north-westerly course. Another French destroyer tried to shadow her, keeping at a safe distance, but *Emden* vanished in a rain squall.

On 28 October *Emden* cruised on the Singapore-Rangoon route, then further to the west on the Sabang-Colombo route. On 30 October she stopped a British steamer whose captain was persuaded to take the French prisoners from the *Mousquet* to Sabang. Before being discharged, the French sailors had to sign an undertaking that they would not resume hostilities against Germany. After releasing the British steamer, *Emden* set her course south towards Simalur where she met her coal ship *Buresk.*

Zhemtchug, *Russian Light Cruiser, launched 1903*





Destroyer Mousquet *sunk by the* Emden *off the Northern entrance of Penang, October 28*

Emden *with her fourth (dummy) funnel. Raiding Penang (Painting)*



Kapitänleutnant v. Mücke, First Officer of Emden

Her raid on Penang deeply impressed not only commercial circles in India but also the British naval command, whose efforts had so far failed to bring *Emden* to battle. Vice-Admiral Jerram now increased his forces operating in the Indian Ocean. They were soon to comprise nine Japanese and British armoured and light cruisers as well as two auxiliary cruisers.

Attacking the Cocos Islands

In attacking this British outpost, Commander v. Müller's objectives were: a) to destroy the cable and W/T station, inflicting material damage, if only temporarily, and interrupting communications between Australia and England; b) to harass shipping on the routes from and to Australia; c) to draw away from the Indian Ocean at least part of the cruiser force pursuing *Emden*.

While steaming towards the Cocos Islands, Müller cruised for two days off the Sunda Strait, but without capturing a prize. He then resumed his course. With her dummy funnel rigged up, and the collier *Buresk* detailed to a rendezvous 30 nautical miles to the north of the South Keeling Group, *Emden* approached the Cocos islands during the night of 8/9 November. At 0600 she arrived at Port Refuge.

As the horizon was clear and no ship was in sight, Müller hoped for a few undisturbed hours to destroy the British cable and W/T station, and then to escape. When the *Emden* anchored, her landing party under the command of First Lieutenant v. Mücke went ashore. It comprised two more officers, six non-commissioned officers and 38 men. They had orders to destroy the British installations and to cut all cables if possible. *Emden*'s wireless operator had orders to jam any W/T traffic issuing from the island. Despite *Emden*'s jamming, the island operator managed to transmit the message: 'Unidentified ship off entrance.' Some time later, after the destruction of the station, *Emden*'s operator heard an unknown warship calling the island. Those on board *Emden* then thought the enemy to be 250 nautical miles away.

As was later determined, the officers of the island station had very soon realised that *Emden*'s fourth funnel was a dummy, and had—in addition to the W/T enemy report quoted above—signalled '*Emden* here'. Although this second message did not get through, the first was picked up by the Australian cruiser *Sydney*. She was escorting a convoy of Australian and New Zealand troops to Colombo, but she immediately altered course for the Cocos Islands, being at that moment only 52 miles away. Müller, basing his decision on an incorrect conjecture, thought there was plenty of time for his landing party.

At 0900 a cloud was sighted in the north, and only 30 minutes later it was recognised as belonging to a warship steaming at high speed. Although Mücke's landing party was about to leave the island it was now too late for them to return on board. *Emden*, for once forsaken by her usual good fortune, had now to face the enemy without an important part of her key personnel.

Emden's Last Exploit

In an attempt to improve her windward position, *Emden*, as soon as her anchor was aweigh, set a north-westerly course at maximum speed, but how would Müller deal with his superior adversary?

In his report he wrote: 'I had to try to inflict such damage on my adversary by gunfire that he would suffer a significant reduction in speed, which would then give me a good opportunity to bring my torpedoes to bear'.

Sydney, approaching from the north, turned straight towards *Emden*. Then, at a distance of about 9500 yards, the former took a roughly parallel course. At this moment, *Emden* opened fire, and with her third salvo straddled *Sydney*. The latter answered the fire immediately, but needed more time to find *Emden*'s range.

As was afterwards learned, Müller's guns had scored two lucky hits in the opening phase of the engagement. A dud hit the foremost range-finder, while another shell put the after control out of action, wounding several of the crew.

Some minutes after opening fire *Emden* turned slightly to starboard; Müller wanted to close the enemy to improve the shooting efficiency of his 4·1in guns. However, as soon as *Sydney* had found *Emden*'s range, the devastating effect of her 6in guns made itself felt. First a shell destroyed the W/T Office, then another killed the crew of the



The numbers in the above diagram indicate the respective positions of HMS Sydney *and of the* Emden *at various stages of the decisive action on 9 November.*

Key: HMS Sydney
- 1-7 *Port Battery*
- 8-11 *Starboard Battery*
- 12-16 *Port Battery*
- 17 *Starboard Battery*

Thereupon 'Ceased Fire', and steered N. in pursuit of the Emden*'s collier*

foremost gun. Soon the electric firing direction gear was out of action and had to be replaced by orders through the speaking tubes. Then the steering gear in the control tower broke down, and steering had to be executed from the aft department. Orders had to be shouted through a megaphone. The foremost funnel fell to port.

No Surrender

To close the range, Müller at 0945 swung again to starboard. Casualties among the crew increased. At 0950 Department 1 reported that the steering gear was no longer responding. It was also impossible to move the hand steering, apparently because its shafting had been jammed by a hit. Until checked by the propellers, *Emden* had swung about eight points to starboard. Because the firing of the starboard battery was considerably weakened, Müller swung round to allow the port battery to resume firing. During this phase of the encounter the range-finders were put out of action.

Meanwhile the fire of the port guns also slackened, probably due to lack of ammunition and heavy casualties among the crew.

Despite his extremely slender chance of getting close enough, Müller again turned towards *Sydney* to reach a torpedo firing position. The distance was about 4500 yards when *Sydney*, after firing a torpedo that missed *Emden*, swung sharply to starboard and stood away at high speed.

The fire of *Emden* became increasingly weaker. By 1045 controlled fire directing was practically impossible, the speaking tubes being damaged. The upper bridge was reduced to a shambles, the centre and after funnels had gone, and the foremast went over the ship's side. In spite of heavy damage Müller made a second attempt to close *Sydney* in order to come within torpedo firing range. However, *Sydney*'s superior speed—25 to 26kn—and the heavier calibre and longer range of her guns proved decisive. She was able to maintain an effective fire while keeping well out of range of the enemy.

Emden's gunfire had now completely ceased and Müller, by stopping the starboard propeller, managed to swing away from his adversary. At last, after his ship had sustained further damage from an underwater hit, Müller realised that he was no longer able to inflict injury on his enemy. He decided, therefore, to wreck *Emden* on North Keeling Island and to attempt to save the lives of the survivors.

Sydney's captain, Glossop, tried in vain to thwart *Emden*'s intention. At 1120 the Australian cruiser ceased firing, and then turned in pursuit of *Emden*'s collier, the captured British steamer *Buresk*. The Germans scuttled their prize when *Sydney* approached, and Glossop returned to *Emden*. He now enquired by signal, 'Will you surrender?' As he received no affirmative answer (*Emden*'s signal-book had been lost in the fires), and as the German ensign was still flying, Glossop assumed that Müller would not give in. He therefore fired on the wreck for another five minutes until the survivors showed white flags.

On his way to Malta as a prisoner of war, Commander v. Müller wrote a sad letter to his relatives in Germany (28 November 1914):

'After a very lucky cruise of several weeks', he wrote, 'the *Emden* met her doom, which was only to be expected if the war continued . . . I am tormented by the thought that her loss might have been prevented in this instance, had I only acted differently . . . You will certainly understand how

HMAS Sydney



badly I felt that in this fight, which caused the destruction of my fine ship and the death of so many of her crew, I had escaped unscathed. The control tower was not hit, although fragments of shell, penetrating through the observation slits, wounded all standing beside me. I alone escaped injury. At first I thought of seeking death on board my ship, but then I realised that my duty was to care for the remainder of the crew—and my death would have been of no use to my country . . .'

'In the afternoon the *Sydney* returned. I had not expected her to resume the attack and was very much astonished when she suddenly opened up again. As I afterwards learned from the *Sydney*'s Captain, they twice made the signal 'Do you surrender?' but this was not understood on board the *Emden*. As there was no reply, the *Sydney* assumed that the *Emden* wished to continue the fight, the more so as an ensign was still flying from the topmast. In order to avoid the useless sacrifice of my men's lives, and as the *Emden* was no longer a warship but a wreck, I showed a white flag as a sign of surrender and ordered the ensign to be taken down from the topmast and burned. I am not quite certain what judgement will be passed on my decision to wreck the *Emden* and on the final surrender of the remaining crew. I believe, however, that I would again act as I did, when faced with the same dilemma.'

The Cost

During the engagement, *Sydney* received about 16 hits, most of them not serious. Her losses were 3 killed and 13 wounded. After *Emden*'s surrender, *Sydney* went to Direction Island to find out what had happened there. To his surprise Glossop found that the German landing party under First Lieutenant v. Mücke had gone. On the next day, on 10 November, he returned to *Emden* to take the surviving crew on board. On 11 November *Sydney* proceeded to Colombo where she arrived on the 15th. The prisoners had been well treated and the care of the wounded was outstanding.

The losses in *Emden*, out of a total of 376 amounted to: *killed* 7 officers, 1 paymaster, 4 warrant officers, 25 non-commissioned officers, 92 men, and 5 civilians (=134); *wounded* 2 officers, 3 warrant officers, 12 non-commissioned officers, 48 men (=65).

Meanwhile, what had become of the landing party on Direction Island? Mücke had watched *Emden*'s fight and had soon realised that the cruiser would never be able to return to pick them up. To remain in command of the island was hopeless, so Mücke ordered his men to prepare *Ayesha*, an old 97-ton ship, ready for sea. Although warned by the British on the island that the ship was no longer seaworthy, Mücke sailed just before darkness fell. He thus escaped with all his men and weapons.

On a long and perilous voyage he succeeded in reaching Padang. From there he sailed for Hodeida in the Turkish occupied Yemen and finally, after travelling overland, he led his men to Constantinople, where he reported to Admiral Souchon in June 1915. His adventures fill a book on its own.

View of Emden *after her destruction by* Sydney ▶

View of Emden *wreck*