Review of 'Crisis into Victory: 1918' by Prof John Derry (May 2008)

The first part of John’s lecture was to examine the German Offensive of Spring 1918 by looking at its planning & training and to look at its brilliance and its faults.

If we start with the aftermath of the Battle of Jutland, 31 May 1916, the High Seas fleet had failed to break the blockade of Germany so the military high command had introduced unrestricted submarine warfare. The result was the entry of the USA into the war in April 1917. Ludendorff’s plans for 1918 included a major offensive on the Western Front using troops from the East before the USA trained its army to join the offensive. Ludendorff’s options included:

1. An attack on the BEF in Flanders;

2. An attack on the French at Verdun and 

3. An attack on the St Quentin area between the Allies and push the BEF back to the coast.

Ludendorff opted for the third choice. It would involve retraining the better soldiers for storm trooper tactics and secrecy was paramount.

But Ludendorff failed to set the strategic target, deciding that tactical success would decide the strategic objective. 18 Army broke through the BEF lines and pushed Gough’s Fifth Army back, 17 & 2 Armies achieved some but less dramatic success. The Germany army was held back by lack of mobility, there were few horses and Ludendorff had never endorsed tanks. 

The Allied response was to appoint Foch was Generalissimo over the armies in the Western Front and in a stroke  the chances of separating the BEF & the French army became very slim. The scale of the German casualties was very high – 250,000 during the March and April offensives, and 850,000 in total between Spring and Autumn.

The May and June attacks on the French army brought less success as the French defensive tactics under Petain were much improved. On 18 July the French counterattacked with considerable success.

Looting of the BEF stores after the front lines were taken can be seen as an indicator of the low morale in the German Army, especially after the turnip winter and a higher than normal desertion rate.

The BEF attack at Amiens in August 1918 saw sensational Allied gains and signs of breakdown in the German Army. The German military high command were faced with few options, they wanted to hold out for a compromise peace, they looked more seriously at Wilson’s points but the position of Chancellor and the lack of democracy in Germany held back any decision.

In September the BEF broke through the Hindenburg Line, 185,000 prisoners were taken by the BEF and 196,000 were taken by the French & USA armies. By October Germany’s allies were in trouble: both Austro-Hungary & Bulgaria were prepared to sue for peace. The Salonika army put down their garden implements and went to war. Ludendorff resigned and the German fleet mutinied.

November brought the final battles and the Armistice – there would be no compromise peace and the decision about how to handle Germany passed from the military to the political wing of government.

Report by Peter Palmer