Review of 'The Third Battle of Ypres 1917' by Professor John Derry (April 2017)

The Third Battle of Ypres, which followed on from the battle at Messines, was really a campaign made up of a series of battles culminating with the Battle of Passchendaele. The casualty rate was comparable to that of the Somme in 1916 and to the Battle for Normandy in 1944. The images of mud and of soldiers struggling to advance along duckboards, let alone the stories of men and animals drowning in the mud, cloud our judgement of this campaign. Hindsight is the enemy of objectivity and the rainfall in August and again in October often leads us to believe a better set of tactics should have been possible.

There were good strategic reasons for a campaign in Flanders in 1917. If the British Army was able to break out of the Ypres Salient, it could not only take possession of the coast (which would deprive the German Navy of using the ports of Ostend and Zeebrugge for U-boat bases ) but also deny the German Army the use of the vital railhead at Roulers. No discussion of Third Ypres can ignore the state of the French Army in mid-1917. The failed Nivelle Offensive of April had had a disastrous effect on morale and on discipline. Units of the French Army had refused to advance when ordered to attack and several had mutinied. General Pétain’s actions to restore morale took months. It is interesting that the German High Command knew nothing about the state of the French Army, and Haig’s campaigns in May and again in June ensured their attention was held elsewhere. In fact Pétain was able to launch limited attacks from the Verdun section from August until October which kept the German Army ‘occupied’. Plumer’s action at Messines had ensured that the Ypres campaign got off to a fine start. Unfortunately Haig ‘swapped’ commanders (Gough for Plumer) for the first battle of the campaign as Gough was seen as more of a thruster than Plumer. Even as the Third Battle of Ypres opened in July, there were doubts that Pétain had solved the problem. The BEF continued to attack aggressively throughout the autumn, attempting again and again to exploit initial successes by maintaining the tactic of ‘bite & hold’.

Unfortunately, the rain in August made the initial stages of the battle very difficult and Gough appeared to ignore the damage caused by not taking the Gheluvelt plateau early in the campaign. Plumer was probably the best of Haig’s generals in the BEF who understood ‘bite and hold’. In September, he took over from Gough and prepared to take the plateau. His preparation for battle used excellent staff work and detailed knowledge of his corps, his divisions and their commanders in the Second Army, and led to the success of the Battles of the Menin Road, Polygon Wood and Broodseinde. Unfortunately, the artillery units were not prepared for such a long campaign. If moving the guns forward in the muddy conditions of Ypres was not enough, continual use of the guns caused irreversible wear on the barrels which unless replaced (which they would be in 1918) led to poor shooting.

Broodseinde was the last assault launched by Plumer in good weather. Between Broodseinde (4 October) and the launch of the attack at Poelcapelle (9 October), the fine weather broke and attacks were made in driving rain. The ground over which the troops would advance had been severely damaged by shelling and rapidly became marshy. Movement of artillery and ammunition became very difficult and many assault were made without adequate artillery help. As the assaults had not reached a defensible line to finish the battle for the autumn, a further assault on the Passchendaele Ridge was ordered. The first assault in October failed due to poor preparation but when Haig turned to the Canadian Corps (CO Currie), proper preparations were put in place and the attack in November was a success.

How were the armies placed at the end of 1917?

On the Eastern Front, the Revolution in Russia was going to bring their war to an end. For Germany this was to be very important as it would no longer have to fight on two fronts. The Peace Treaty of Brest- Litovsk was very punitive towards Russia and was to destroy any likelihood of a negotiated peace on the Western Front. The unrestricted U-boat campaign had brought the USA into the war. In 1917, this was not going to make any great impression as the Americans only had a small army. But given time, they would recruit and train a very large army which would be transported over to Europe. Only time would tell. The pressure was now on the German High Command. The first task was to transfer their troops from the East during which 10% of them would desert. Ludendorff was to organize an assault on the Allied lines in the West in early 1918 before Britain (with the aid of the USA) could act.

All of these actions were to produce a new definition of ‘Success’, now it was to mean ‘To deny the Enemy any chance of a Breakthrough’. It also meant the advent of the ‘All Arms Conflict’, artillery, aircraft and tanks taking control of the battlefield so that infantry became secondary in the initial phases of the battle. Infantry were necessary to hold the ground that had been taken. This was to be skill that was learned and perfected by the Allies in the final 100 days of 1918.

Report by Peter Palmer