Review of 'Brothers in Arms - Breaking the Hindenburg Line and Operational Analysis' by Clive Harris (December 2018)

During the Spring Offensive of 1918, the German Army had made considerably advances through the British and French lines but each time they had been fought to a stalemate. The Allied response had commenced in July with the battle of Le Hamel where the Australian Corps had taken the opposing German line along the overlooking ridge within 90 minutes by use of an ‘all arms’ offensive. This was repeated in August by a larger offensive at Amiens (involving troops from the Australian Corps, the Canadian Corps, the III Corps of the BEF and a Corps from the French Army) which had achieved its objective in four days. In September the AEF, under General Pershing (along with support from the French Army), had launched an offensive in the St Mihiel salient to clear away the German troops and advance on Metz. This offensive took three days but did not result in an attack on Metz, instead the AEF were directed to attack the Meuse-Argonne area and link up with the French Army.

Marshal Foch, as Generalissimo of the Allied Armies on the Western Front, was co-ordinating the series of attacks which ultimately would result in the gradual withdrawal of the German Army and the Armistice. During the Battle of Amiens, a confidential copy of the defensive positions in the Hindenburg Line had fallen into Allied hands. As a result, General Rawlinson (GOC Fourth Army BEF) instructed General Monash (GOC Australian Corps) to co-ordinate an attack along the St Quentin Canal and break through the Hindenburg Line using Australian troops, British troops (III Corps and IX Corps) and II Corps of the AEF.

The American troops had been allocated to the Australian Corps which was, by now, short of manpower and many of their soldiers were showing signs of strain. Having been engaged in heavy fighting for several months, there had been instances of ‘near mutiny’ by troops who refused to re-enter the front line as they felt unfairly put upon. Monash planned to attack at the Bellicourt Tunnel with American and Australian troops while the British troops attacked across the canal where German resistance was anticipated to be weak.

The training of the American troops was not as methodical as that planned by Monash and which was carried out by the Australian and British Corps. The Australian officers and NCOs could only offer advice, during the battle the American troops would be officered by their own inexperienced officers. Not all the American troops had been issued with the same type of machine gun, staffing of the signallers in the Communication units was not as high and the American troops who had trained with French tanks were now using the British Mark Vs. During the initial stages of the battle, the Mark V tanks strayed into a minefield and were ‘knocked out’.

Fog on the first morning of the attack (27 September) confused the troops of the AEF and contributed to the poor ‘mopping up’. The German resistance was considerably stronger than was expected and the advancing AEF troops took a high casualty rate due to the concentrated machine gun fire and the artillery bombardment. In too many cases, loss of officers and NCOs resulted in troops failing to advance without further orders or troops straying from their original path. During the day, observers with the RAF were unable to accurately determine the extent of the breakthrough.

To the south of the AEF, 46th (North Midland) Division (GOC Gerald Boyd who had risen through the ranks from being a private in 1895 and by 1918 was a brilliant innovator who never lost sight of the needs of the infantry) advanced on the Canal du Nord (with boats, rafts and ladders with troops in life jackets) 24 hours later on 28 September. Heavy fighting limited the advance until nightfall.

Fog on the morning of 29 September favoured the attackers as confused German defenders were unable to ascertain the moment that the BEF troops would emerge and overwhelm them. Several footbridges as well as the Riqueval bridge had not been heavily defended and fell to the Midlands troops. All along the east bank of the canal, hundreds of German troops found themselves trapped in their dugouts from they emerged as prisoners after the threats of grenade attacks were issued.

The battle was to continue into October as the German resistance especially in the Bellicourt Tunnel sector was particularly strong. Monash withdrew the American troops as two Australian Divisions, passing through the American lines, attempted a breakthrough. Although the 46th Division had crossed the canal and were able to exploit their breaking of the Hindenburg Line, it was the Australian troops who took heavy casualties (over 2,000) clearing their section of German soldiers.

Failure to accomplish all the targets of the battle appears to be due to the heavy fog and the ‘greenness’ of the attacking American troops, who suffered over 13,000 casualties. The Australian Corps were now withdrawn from the line for rest and training and were preparing to join the advance in November when the Armistice was declared.

Report by Peter Palmer