Review of '21st Division at the Battle of Loos, 1915' by Derek Clayton (September 2018)

The 21st Division, established in 1914, was part of Kitchener’s Third New Army, K3, received their rudimentary training in England before embarking for France in early September, 1915.

The battle was to be the biggest British attack of 1915 and the first-time poison gas was used by the BEF (in part to compensate for the shortage of shells). It was also the first mass engagement of the New Army units. The battle was part of the Third Battle of Artois in which the BEF would be the junior partner. Initially French (C-in-C BEF) and Haig (GOC First Army) had wanted only an artillery contribution to the battle as the terrain was unsuitable for an infantry attack. Over ruled by Kitchener, French instructed Haig to plan an attack using two Corps and poison gas to make up for this lack of available artillery shells. The attack on the first day (September 25th) saw the BEF take the town of Loos (with a high casualty rate) amongst other breaks-through. Haig now requested the use of the Reserve troops (1000) but only received French’s consent at 1220. The 21st Division, along with the 24th and the Guards Divisions, was part of XI Corps (GOC Haking), the reserve that French had guarded so jealously. 

The 21st Division in 1915 was comprised of 62, 63 and 64 Brigades, its commanding officer was Major-General Forestier-Walker. After orders were received to advance to the front, traffic moving back from the front and traffic moving from their left resulted in an extremely slow rate of advance. The men were not going to go into action until the second day - 26th September.

Men from the 62nd and 63rd Brigades advanced first (64 Brigade were kept in reserve during the first stages). Two battalions from 62nd Brigade advanced to reconnoitre Hill 70 but soon came under machine gun fire from German troops in Loos. Men from 63rd Brigade advanced to the north of Loos and they too came under fire from German machine guns, this time from Chalk Pit Wood. 

The plan had been for the 21st and 24th Divisions to advance with 1st Division, to their north, to attack Hulloch and 15th Division, to their south, to attack Hill 70 but the artillery support was lacking. Those few guns which had been brought up were only firing two shells per battery per minute. The German high command brought up reserve troops to re-enforce their second line and to push the British back.

By this time 62nd Brigade had taken nearly 1500 casualties, 73 being officers, and began to retire. 63rd Brigade were now unable to advance any further having come under attack by German troops who had advanced into the woods during the night. These German soldiers advanced in two directions, and having lost their bearings, began firing on each other. This pinned down the German advance and 64thBrigade sent the 14 DLI forward to reinforce 63rd Brigade. 63rd Brigade, having lost their brigadier to German machine gun fire, also retired. 15DLI, also from 64th Brigade, advanced midmorning but, having taken heavy casualties, they were withdrawn. By 1230 63rd and 64th Brigades had decided to abandon the attack.

At this point, GSO3 of 21st Division, Lt-Colonel Campbell, arrived at the forward brigade HQ and insisted on further attacks. As a result, 9th and 10th KOYLI, the only unused troops available, were told to advance. 9th KOYLI made for the Lens-Hulloch road with 10th KOYLI in support. 10th KOYLI lost their way and made for the fighting on Hill 70. This brought them into machine gun in the flank from German troops in Bois Hugo Chalet. The KOYLI men retreated back to their start lines.

Major-General Forestier-Walker (GOC 21st Division) who had come forward to observe the attack for himself, reached 64th Brigade HQ as the troops retreated. Having ascertained the outcome of all the attacks, he ordered withdrawal. The remaining troops in XI Corps, the Guards Division and the 3rd Cavalry Division, were now ordered forward. Arriving just after midnight 26/27 September, there were fresh troops in place by the morning.

In one day, 21st Division casualties were 198 officers, and 3853 other ranks, over 1000 of these (including 65 officers) were fatalities.

In his report on the battle, Forestier-Walker includes three important reasons for the failure of his men to achieve their objective: insufficient training of the men, the high loss of officers each time battalions went into action and the physical state of the men – the general pointed out they had been tired out by the marching to the front line and were very poorly provisioned before the attack.

Report by Peter Palmer