Review of 'The British Third Army in the Last 100 days battles of 1918' by Dr Jonathan Boff (March 2019)

The last 100 days campaign of 1918 demonstrated the superiority and training for all arms combat of the BEF. The BEF assumed the strategic weight of the Allies’ policy in the field and was able to fulfil the war policy of the British Government in the conflict. Tactically it was also able to assume the defeat of the German Army in conjunction with its Allies as part of a well-managed coalition.

After the German Spring Offensives wore themselves out in the limited attacks on Amiens, Ypres, the Aisne and finally the Marne, the BEF was ready for its counter attack. This was demonstrated by the limited attack by the Australian Corps on the German line at Le Hamel in July. Keeping total security on the plans to attack, General Monash took the German lines with a surprise attack at sunrise (in fog which confused both attacking soldiers and defending Germans) with tanks and infantry with artillery and the RAF in support. The objectives were taken within 90 minutes.

After the success at le Hamel, the Fourth Army of the BEF planned an even larger attack at Amiens. Once again secrecy was paramount. The plan involved four separate corps, the Canadian Corps (which had to be moved in secrecy from the Vimy region), the Australian Corps, III Corps of the BEF and a corps from the French First Army. Once again, the attack took place in the early morning as infantry advanced with tanks in fog with artillery neutralising the German guns and the RAF harassing any movement behind German lines. Whippet tanks supported the cavalry advance and armoured cars were towed across No Mans Land so as the cause havoc in the German forward lines. Once the initial objectives were taken and German resistance had hardened, this attack was called off and the next offensive involving the Third Army of the BEF was planned for later in August.

The same plan of attack was used by both the BEF and the French armies in the ongoing offensives. This involved set targets with fresh troops used in waves until resistance from the German defenders hardened and then the attack was closed down. The advance of the Allied armies was still slow, barely one mile a day on average. Prince Rupprecht (Generalfeldmarschall of the Rupprecht Group of Armies on the Western Front) ordered troop withdrawal along his part of the line in September. The American expeditionary Force opened their offensive to clear the St Mihiel salient with logistical support from the French Fourth Army on September 12. After the success of this action, the AEF resumed the offensive by attacking in the Meuse Argonne on September 26. This action was to engage the American troops into November as German resistance in the heavy wooded steep valley of the Meuse proved to be particularly tough.

Foch instructed all armies to attack in a concerted action to drive the German line from Ypres to Verdun also in September . Logistics to provide for such an offensive produced as many problems to Foch’s staff as the German resistance did. By late September the Hindenburg Line (a series of defensive fortifications stretching from the Aisne river to Arras) had been reached. Problems within the German heartland regarding food supplies and security led to riots and near mutiny. Troops were now required to ensure security in the major cities. The two leading commanders of the German army (Hindenburg and Ludendorff) requested an armistice from the Kaiser so that the German Army could regroup and sort out the problems.The Kaiser appointed a new government in Berlin and the new chancellor requested an armistice from the American president, Woodrow Wilson. Woodrow Wilson insisted any armistice was dependent on the German Government accepting the 14 points he had outlined earlier in 1918. The offensive on the Western Front continued.

The BEF crossed the Canal du Nord in September and continued to attack towards the river Selle, Courtrai and the Lys during October, and Valenciennes and the river Sambre in November before the German government agreed to an Armistice on Wilson’s proposals.

Developments in tactics for the BEF during 1918 were considerably more advanced than anything resembling developments in the German army. The RAF, for instance, now undertook bombing campaigns behind German lines and supplied front line troops with supplies by parachute in addition to their usual ‘day job’ of observation and defense. The use of artillery to provide barrages with British guns taking into account weather conditions together with an adequate supply of shells and replacement barrels was another example of improvement.

Before the German Spring Offensive (January & February 1918) the BEF had been in defensive mode but there had been no planning for any prevention of a German Advance. After the battle of Amiens (August 1918) and during the final 100 days of the war, the BEF was in continuous attack with its French and American Allies. What is more apparent now is the lack of German planning during the retreat of their armies during this continual onslaught.

The eventual defeat of the German Army in the autumn of 1918 is usually attributed to one or more of three options:

(i)    The stab in the back theory;
(ii)    Ludendorff and the lack of a concrete plan from senior staff;
(iii)    The German army being ground down by continual material deficiencies.

Probably none of these. Far more important was the lack of mission-control by the senior staff. There was no pattern of junior officers thinking through their immediate problems due to far too much micro-management of their immediate superiors. This might have been due to the lack of vital information of the true state of the front being passed back to senior officers.

The issue of tanks and the lack of a comprehensive German response by use of mobile artillery certainly had an effect of the success of the BEF during the last 100 days. There was certainly a lack of flexibility in the German defense which might have been due to ossification at higher levels of the German staff. In the BEF, the most important decisions during the British advance (and the German retreat) were taken by ‘the man on the spot’, a theory which had been part of officer training in the BEF since 1914. 

The important difference between junior officers in the two armies is seen most clearly in which side showed initiative during the semi-open warfare of the last 100 days.

Report by Peter Palmer