Review of 'Bradford Boys at Bullecourt' by Fraser Skirrow (May 2019)

Mobilized in August 1914, the 2/6 West Yorks were not deployed in Ireland during 1916 but were deployed, as part of the 62nd (West Yoshiro) Division to France in 1917. In common with other 2nd line Territorial troops, they suffered greatly from a shortage of equipment which affected their training.

The first battle of Bullecourt (April 1917) was planned to assist the offensive at Arras. It was hastily planned and mounted and was a failure. The 62nd Division along with the Australian 4th Division were expected to attack either side of the village of Bullecourt aided by tanks. Inadequate artillery fire, late arrival of tanks and lack of co-ordination between the Yorkshire troops and the Australians contributed to this failure.

When Lt-Col Hastings, commander of the 2/6 West Yorks, read through his instructions for the first day of the second attack on Bullecourt (May), he was apprehensive. His troops would attack to the right of the 2/5 battalion with the Australian troops on his right. But there was a problem with clearing the German trench between his attack on Bullecourt and the Australians. He felt he needed men from another battalion (held in reserve) as his companies were seriously under manned. The Brigade staff disagreed, their refusal to move men from the reserve meant the original plan stood. Unfortunately, there was the additional problem of a shortage of bombers and rifle grenadiers in the 2/6 which would make trench clearing very difficult. There was one further obstacle which had not been seen. This was the abandoned tank from the April attack which had been incorporated into the German defence and which would prove to be a formidable problem for the attacking troops in May.

When the attack opened with troops from both Yorkshire brigades and Australian brigades advancing on the German lines, problems were soon encountered. Part of A company and all of B company of the 2/6 West Yorks managed to get through gaps in the wire, but as the Australian troops had not cleared the German line between the two brigades, machine gun fire from their right forced the attacking Bradford men to veer to their left. When C company advanced aided by two tanks, they were held up by machine gun fire from both left and right. C company pulled back and the tanks withdrew. The infantry attack had lost direction and most of the officers in the attack had become casualties by this time. 

The surviving troops appeared to be unwilling to advance further without their officers. The arrival of D company did not help matters, there was no co-operation between the men, D company veered further left into men from 2/5 West Yorks. Somehow infantry found their way into the ruins of Bullecourt village but without officers. Comments from observers after the battle implied that initial withdrawal of a few troops led to undisciplined retreat which was described later as a rout. By this time a sizable fraction of A company was not accounted for, even the arrival of another tank brought no response. After the battle, when questioned, Australian troops, advancing to the right of the 2/6 West Yorks, reported they had seen no evidence of troops from A company. Of the 12 officers of the 2/6 who had been involved in the attack, all became casualties and 6 were killed. Of the 340 men who attacked over 80% were casualties after the battle.

What might have been the reasons for the failure? The standard of discipline among the men? The lack of ‘fighting spirit’? The failure of the tanks to support the infantry? Or might it have been lack of co-ordination with the Australian troops on the right?

A more reasoned argument might include the lack of communication between all levels of management before and during the attack. Certainly, the poor performance of the tanks, especially their time of arrival on the battlefield and the number and allocation of tanks to the separate phases of the advance. No one had mentioned training. Pre-Somme training was to prove to be inadequate for the Bullecourt attack, this time complex formations required more skilled battlefield management and more experienced officers.

After the battle it is easy to assume that Lt-Col Hastings had been correct and his brigade major and brigadier had been wrong in assuming the allocation of men to taking the right-hand trench at the commencement of the battle were adequate for a complex task. One reason for their dismissal of Hastings’ assessment could have been their poor opinion of Territorial Force troops. This prejudice was hard to overcome but as the war progressed into 1918, it is easy to see that this was incorrect. But hind-site is wonderful after the event.

Report by Peter Palmer