Review of 'All Arms Warfare – a West Yorkshire Brigade at Cambrai, 1917' by Fraser Skirrow (October 2022)

The plan for the combined Tanks and Infantry attack at Cambrai in the autumn of 1917 was accused, at the time, as not being really new. The use of Artillery to soften up the enemy’s front line followed by tanks and infantry had been used in 1916. Using troops to occupy the trenches taken was not new, neither were the plans to destroy counter attacks from the enemy.

But what was new was the use of ‘surprise and shock’ to demoralise the defenders. This would involve a whirlwind bombardment to disrupt communications. Also, the speed and momentum of the attack from Zero Hour was a vast improvement on the past. Contingency planning was also new, this involved close co-operation between tanks and infantry which had been rehearsed before the battle; as well as giving the commanders in the field the freedom to manoeuvre if a gap appeared and to use troops to protect flanks without requesting permission from senior officers. 

The Battlefield for 185 Brigade at Havrincourt included a chateau and park which would not be a hazard, felled trees which would be major obstacles for tanks, and the Hindenburg Line, a heavy defended trench system which would require tanks to breach. The German defence was dominated by the idea that any attack would be similar to a trench raid in order to ‘nip out’ a section of the line. As a result, extra machine guns were brought up and dug in in front of Havrincourt. This section of the German line was held by two Landwehr regiments (384 and 387) and 54 Regular Infantry Reserve. A Landwehr regiment was seen as a ‘third line’ regiment, ranking after the Regular troops and the Reserve. Usually Landwehr troops would be older, having served in the reserve many years before, and were often used to hold quiet sections of the line.

The British attack on November 20th was no trench raid, it was an attack by six divisions preceded by a carefully calculated artillery bombardment, supported by over 300 tanks.

185 and 187 Brigades of 62nd Division were to lead the attack on Havrincourt, supported by 58 tanks from G, D and E companies. Failure of the tanks to arrive was not to prevent the troops advancing, speed of attack was essential. When gaps were observed on either flank, troops and/or tanks would immediately move forward to fill them, and counter attacks were to be resisted under the control of forward troops without reference to higher command further back. And finally, 16 tanks would advance in line before they could fan out and cause havoc along the German lines.

At Zero Hour (6.20am), the attack began. The whirlwind artillery barrage did what was expected: communications were cut and German units stunned. In the attack on Havrincourt, 2/4 KOYLI advanced without tanks, which were held up but did join the troops shortly afterwards. 2/6 West Yorks took heavy casualties from the machine gun fire and there were no tanks to come to their aid. Tanks allocated here moved out of line and outflanked the German troops facing the 2/6. 2/7 West Yorks advanced as planned, their tanks were the ones to fan out and attack the German line.

The German defenders require artillery support but as all communication were cut, the officers had to resort to runners who did not return. Seeing so many troops aided by tanks advancing on them, several German soldiers panicked and began to retire. This is when the RFC showed its hand by strafing the German front line.

At 7.30am the barrage moved back and the tanks began to outpace the infantry. The key to success was to probe the flanks looking for weak spots. The first troops to break through the German line were the 2/4 KOYLI. At this time the German officers facing the attacks were still unable to communicate their problems to either the artillery or their superiors.

By 8.30am it was obvious to the German commanders that a counter attack by reserve troops was very unlikely as there was no way to communicate with the artillery regarding a supporting barrage. By this time troops from 2/8 West Yorks were advancing on T wood to the east of Havrincourt and would eventually take the wood from the Germans. At 10am Havrincourt was still in German hands but it was also virtually surrounded by British troops. Spasmodic action by machine guns  still held up the advance which still required the help of tanks. Attempts were made by German troops to counter attack but were hampered by inefficient organisation. This lack of overall control of the defence led to some chaotic scenes. Eventually tanks, moving from the rear of the village, co-ordinated with troops on the ground and further advances were possible. As more German troops withdrew without orders, morale of the remaining troops fell and surrender to the victorious Yorkshire troops became inevitable.

One of the main reasons for this quick victory was the poor quality and the poor leadership of the Landwehr troops defending Havrincourt. Together with a lack of armoured defence and confusion after the initial whirlwind barrage from the British artillery this did mean the planned defence was never going to be sufficient against the new ‘all arms’ tactics. Other factors which favoured the British were the fitting of the Mark IV tanks with fascines so that the widened trenches could be crossed easily. The speed and momentum of troops trained to co-ordinate with tanks and to move forward continuously meant the plan of attack was excellent. Finally, one of the key factors was the training of the officers and the reliance on the initiative of the officer in the field to manoeuvre and out-flank problems meant that there was no waiting just forward movement.

Report by Peter Palmer

Below is a video of the presentation by Fraser Skirrow