Review of 'Re-evaluating the role of tanks at the Battle of Bullecourt, 11th April 1917’ by David Brown (October 2023)

After the Battle of the Somme in 1916, the German Army pulled back to a heavily defended position, Siegfriedstellung, which we know as the Hindenburg Line, in 1917. After General Nivelle replaced Marshal Joffre as commander of the French on the Western Front, Nivelle developed a plan to break through the German lines on the Chemin des Dames. The British contribution to this attack would be diversionary attacks by Third and Fifth Armies. The French Offensive was planned to start on April 16 (unfortunately the plans had fallen into German hands so this would not be a surprise) and Third Army’s attack on Vimy Ridge (to the north west) would start on April 6th. Fifth Army’s attack at Bullecourt (to the south east) was scheduled to start on April 10th but a snow storm put the attack back by one day.

The attack on Bullecourt was to be carried out by two brigades of4th Australian Division of I Anzac Corps. Tanks had been chosen to breakthrough the German defences as artillery was considered insufficient here. The tanks (a mixture of the obsolete Mk I and the training tanks MkII) came from 11 Company D Battalion of the Heavy Branch Machine Gun Corps (tank commander was Major William Watson, whose idea of replacing the creeping barrage with the tanks being his idea). The tanks would not only replace the creeping barrage but crush the barbed wire and then destroy the machine gun posts, allowing the Australian troops to capture the German trenches. The attack would incorporate the villages of Bullecourt, Riencourt and Hendecourt.

Twelve tanks had been allocated for this battle, three groups of four tanks (one would support the left flank attack, another the right flank and the third would support the central action) each with zero hour being 0410. The aim was to use female tanks to clear trenches with machine gun fire with the Australians following close behind.

Unfortunately, the tanks were highly visible against the snow and became targets for the German artillery and machine gun fire. The arrival of the tanks on the battlefield was delayed by problems involving their clutches and the detritus on the battlefield jamming the tracks. One of the tanks (supporting the central attack) failed completely to join the infantry. When the tanks became stranded in full view of the German artillery, they were destroyed one by one, unless they withdrew to their start line.

Apparently, the German troops were using armour piercing ammunition when firing directly at the tanks. Without either a creeping barrage or assistance from tanks, the Australian troops were not deterred from advancing and they were able to enter the German front line. Problems with communication between the Australian troops in the German trenches and their superiors, combined with German attempts to retake the trenches, led to observers cancelling artillery support.

The position rapidly became untenable, no further advances could be made and German counter-attacks became more successful. Eventually, at 1225 evacuation of the German lines was ordered and the remaining Australian troops retired to their own front line. The Australian troops suffered over 3,000 casualties, half of whom were taken prisoner.  Overall, only the tanks supporting the right flank had any positive effect on the attack.

Recriminations began immediately, the tanks were assumed to not be reliable enough to support troops in place of a creeping barrage. The low speed of tanks had not been taken into account, they moved much slower than advancing soldiers on foot. Blame had to be shared between Goughs decision to use tanks in place of artillery and the Australian commanders for poor observation and staff work. The confidence in tanks hit a low which was not changed until the Battle of Le Hamel in 1918. Improvements in the armour for the Mark IV tanks (later in 1917) meant these were more resistant to the German armour (as were the MK V used at Le Hamel).

The conditions within the tanks should also come under scrutiny. The high level of carbon monoxide, a known poisonous gas, from the exposed engine in the middle of the tank’s interior was a major problem. This gas restricted the ability of the lungs to take up oxygen so that the tank crew suffered headaches & dizziness, often collapsing when they managed to crawl out of the tank.
Carbon monoxide was not the only problem facing the occupants of the tanks at Bullecourt. Rising temperatures in an unventilated environment was also dangerous.

As temperatures rose to above 94F (31C), the efficiency of the human body started to drop. In action, the temperature could rise to 50C.After one hour, nausea could set in with the occupants being sick or having difficulty concentrating on orders. The noise in the tank was such that verbal communication was impossible. Simple hand signals were devised for issuing orders and essential communication.  Metal splinters from the external machine gun bullets hitting the tanks’ armour were a continuous hazard.

Overall, one has to admire the bravery and skill of the men who managed to take their tanks into the front line. The reasons for their failure are listed above and future tanks (like the Mark IV and the Mark V) evolved from improving those features which were possible.

Report by Peter Palmer 

Below is a video of the presentation by David Brown