Review of 'The BEF in Mobile Warfare - The Pursuit to the Selle 9-11 Oct 1918' by Peter Hodgkinson (September 2023)

What is meant by ‘mobile warfare’? We must not confuse the experiences of mobile troops in WW1 with, for example, Rommel’s panzer corps crossing the same part of Northern France in 1940.

Before the ‘Last 100 Days’, the experiences of mobile warfare were limited to two actions: in 1917 following the retreat of the German Army to the Hindenburg Line (in which limited fighting took place); and the retreat in 1918 in the face of the German Spring Offensive. It was in this latter occasion that skills were developed which were to be of use in the ‘Pursuit to the Selle’ in October.

After the Battle of Amiens, 8-12 August, the Allies pushed the German Army back to the Hindenburg Line, which was crossed at the St Quentin Canal on the 29th September. To the north of Fourth Army, Third Army defeated the Germans at Cambrai over 3 days, 8th – 10th October. As the German Army was pulling back to the River Selle, Fourth Army followed in pursuit.
In their memoirs both Haig and Rawlinson record that in their view, the German Army had disappeared and were actually hoping that the Allied cavalry would ‘have an opportunity to harass the retreating enemy if only a crack in the German line could be exploited’.

Three corps from Fourth Army were involved in this pursuit (9th-12th October) – IX, II American Corps and XIII Corps. IX was the most southerly of the three. On the morning of October 9th, in IX Corps 46th Division advanced at 0520 to take Fresnoy station without an artillery barrage. It would take until 1430 before the objective was taken. On their flank 6th Division advanced with a barrage. It would appear that the German Army prepared for their retreat by using contemporary maps and were able to plan better artillery harassment on the advancing Fourth Army using a mixture of shells and gas to bombard any position very accurately. In contrast the Fourth Army appear to have advanced without maps and had little control. Eventually, when Fourth Army would advance, any position suspected as a German stronghold would be bombarded before the troops advanced.

On the second day of the Advance (October 10th) the cavalry advanced on Riqueval Wood and took heavy casualties while 6th Division advanced once again with an artillery barrage. This time reconnaissance was carried out using a calvary and a cyclist battalion. Although tanks arrived to support the troops, they did not advance with the troops on this day. Once again, the artillery was used to fire on any position which might have been an enemy stronghold.

On the third day (October 11th), 46th division was deployed to take Riqueval Wood both frontally and on the flank. Machine gun fire from the wood initially pinned down the British troops. The château in the wood was taken by the 1/5 Leicesters but was retaken by German troops before nightfall. IX Corps decided to bombard the wood and force the German troops to withdraw.
On the fourth day (October 11th), 6th Division attacked the ridge adjacent to the wood but without accurate up to date maps, they found their attack facing increased German resistance. This failure of mapping and intelligence was to become a major problem in the next few days.

To their immediate north, II American Corps advanced with the support of the Australian artillery, tanks and aircraft as the Australian Corps was out of the line being rested. This advance went smoothly on day one. When the American troops reached a potential German stronghold, the advance stopped and artillery and tank support was requested. This slowed down the rate of advance of the American Corps but, despite the German’s skilful retreat (which appeared to be well planned), the advance on the Selle was faster than the Allied troops on the left and the right.

To the north of the American soldiers, XIII Corps experience similar problems. On day one, after an artillery barrage, the troops advanced in fog from early morning. This fog impeded RAF reconnaissance, and the advance was halted by stiff German resistance. When cavalry were deployed, German artillery, using gas, and German aircraft attacks stopped the advance. Armoured cars were requested to support the cavalry but were unable to join the attack as they were unable to move over the rough ground (the chassis of an armoured car was identical to that of a 1917 civilian car). Individual acts of bravery did harass the German withdrawal but the attack of the Canadian cavalry, Fort Garry Horse, experienced a high casualty rate from machine gun fire. It would appear the retreating German soldiers had a higher morale and confidence in their ability during this retreat. Rawlinson records in his diary that this was a ‘sticky time’ for his troops.

XIII Corps continued to attack on days two and three but there was little action as the German troops had withdrawn even further back towards the River Selle.

The RAF had a varied experience during these three days. Initially 200 pilots were sent up on day one but mist, low cloud and rain reduced their reconnaissance. There was little difference in days two and three although the number of pilots in the air had reduced to below 190.

During the pursuit there would appear to little ‘tempo’ in the tactics of the BEF. Tactics were poor as the objectives set for each Corps were often almost impossible for the troops. This was probably due to the variable intelligence of the German positions, the lack of understanding of a methodical plan of attack and to experiences from the Somme battles. This was a very different experience after the rehearsed river crossing in September.

The BEF was a ‘Mobile Army’ in 1918 but the use of tanks in the front line demanded a set of co-ordinated actions. They had to be moved up to the front by rail, the deployed had to be carried out at night and, after all this, they moved forward in the advance at 5 mph. Armoured cars were in their infancy, they were unreliable in their mechanical construction. Although they could move at a maximum of 35 mph on roads, their chasses were too weak for use over rough terrain. In use, they were very vulnerable to artillery. German sabotage to roads and bridges, unseen by reconnaissance, caused major problems.

Information or the lack of it was the real cause of the ‘stickiness’ referred to by Rawlinson. There was co-operation when intelligence was accurate. Leapfrogging in the tempo expected in battle was possible, the infantry had been trained in the tactics outlined in SS143, especially in the use of machine guns and mortars. And  ‘devolved command’ allowing officers in the front line to use their own experience and training had a very positive effect on the pursuit.

The use of artillery was too varied to be called good. The infantry would often advance without artillery help. Too often the barrage would fall on unoccupied ground This was due to the lack of intelligence regarding the German positions. The tactical use of mobile machine gun units was still in its infancy. Lack of intelligence was due to the RAF being unable to contribute due to the weather. The German positions were not mapped from the air until the 10th October. Communications were in severe need of improvement: wireless was in its infancy, although the RAF could communicate with the artillery, this was limited by the use of 12-foot masts which exposed positions to aerial attack.
As far as ‘Mobile Warfare’ was concerned, the ‘friction of war’ and the difference between the separate elements discussed above left the individual officer using his common sense and training to develop the will for continual advance of his troops.

Report by Peter Palmer