'Lieutenant Colonel Herbert Gordon Carter, DSO Pioneer Battalion Commander on the Western Front' by William Westerman

Lieutenant Colonel Herbert Gordon Carter, DSO Pioneer Battalion Commander on the Western Front by William Westerman

(Originally published on Stand To! No.117 February, 2020). Made freely available as key material for the online course The Imperial Western Front created in conjunction with the University of Kent).

In March 1916, the Australian Imperial Force (AIF) was resting, reorganising, retraining and re–equipping in Egypt in preparation for a move to the Western Front. During this period a new type of unit was introduced into Australian divisions: the pioneer battalion. Structured like an infantry battalion, pioneer units were trained as engineers and infantry, augmenting a division’s engineering capability while providing the divisional commander with a reserve of infantry. Their personnel were selected because of their technical skills and trades in addition to their training as infantrymen. They were unique units, raised by the British Army due to a perceived need for additional field engineers to meet the demands of trench warfare. The inspiration for this hybrid unit came from the Indian Army, where pioneer battalions had been a staple of military campaigning. 

Citizen soldier and engineer

Each Australian division raised a pioneer battalion; the 5th Australian Division’s unit was the 5th Australian Pioneer Battalion, created primarily from men of 8, 14 and 15 Australian infantry brigades. Temporary command of the battalion was given to Major Herbert Gordon Carter, an experienced citizen soldier and engineer. Born in Sydney in 1885, Carter was a product of two elite educational institutions: Sydney Grammar School and The King’s School, Parramatta.(1) He studied electrical and mechanical engineering at the University of Sydney, graduating with first–class honours. He became an associate member of the Institute of Civil Engineers, London in 1912 and was soon the Principal Assistant Electrical Engineer in the state Department of Public Works. In addition to his strong interest in engineering, he was also a keen part–time soldier. Rather than joining the Australian Engineers, however, he spent four years as an enlisted soldier, and then a further four as a lieutenant in the Sydney University Scouts, an infantry battalion. By the outbreak of war, he was commanding the unit’s D Company.(2)

Carter shared the same demographic profile as other part–time Australian infantry officers of his generation, many of whom also rose to command battalions. He was, in many respects, a typical Australian commanding officer (CO) of the Great War: a well–educated, middle–class, Protestant with a white–collar occupation and experience in the pre–war militia. At the start of the war, he enlisted in the 1st Australian Infantry Battalion in Sydney and fought on Gallipoli, invalided twice off the peninsula; once for shock and once for exhaustion.(3) On 22 November 1915, he was promoted to major, and by the start of 1916 he was acting in command of the battalion, his predecessor having become ‘dangerously ill’ and later died.(4) While in Egypt the AIF expanded by two additional divisions and to create the corresponding infantry units the first 16 battalions were split in half to form ‘sister’ units for the new divisions. 

The 1st Australian Infantry Battalion was split to create the 53rd Australian Infantry Battalion, to which Carter was transferred on 13 February to act in command.(5) His time in the 53rd was short–lived, however, as on 3 March 1916 the 5th Australian Pioneer Battalion was formed with ‘about 550 men from various units of [the 5th] division’ and Carter was transferred the same day.(6) 

New Challenges

The task of commanding a pioneer battalion combined the new, uncertain challenges of being in charge of a unit based on a largely untested concept with the age–old issues of command when on active service. Like an infantry battalion, the commander had to manage his headquarters staff and lead the four company commanders under him; unlike an infantry battalion, his direct superior was neither an infantry brigadier nor the divisional commander. When Secretary of State for War Field Marshal Horatio Herbert Kitchener introduced pioneer battalions into his New Army divisions, they were allotted as divisional troops under the authority of the Commander, Royal Engineers (CRE). The CRE, with a small headquarters staff, was already responsible for organising the work of three field companies (one per brigade), a mining corps, a tunnelling company, a bridging train, signal troops and a signal company.(7) They would plan the general scheme of works to be undertaken, placing his subordinate units (now including the pioneers) in the role of contractors.(8)

The problem for both the CRE and the pioneer battalion commander was that the pioneers sat awkwardly within the CREs authority. The CRE effectively acted like a battalion commander with the three field companies as his sub–units. In that structure, the pioneer battalion was an unusual attachment, with hundreds of additional men under the command of another lieutenant colonel with their system of administration.(9) In addition, both the CRE and the pioneer CO were lieutenant colonels, which had the potential to create command issues. For instance, when Lieutenant Colonel Leslie Mather was appointed the CRE 5th Australian Division on 27 March 1918 he was only a temporary lieutenant colonel, significantly junior in seniority to Carter who had been a substantive lieutenant colonel since 29 August 1916.(10) 

Alongside this chain of command confusion, pioneer battalion commanders faced an important issue: neither the senior commanders nor the COs themselves were sure about their role – would they be predominantly engineers or infantry? (11) Charles Bean, the official Australian correspondent during the war, wrote that pioneer COs had a ‘slow and difficult task, selecting for his officers infantrymen or engineers with high–class engineering or mining experience, and then set to work to break down the notion among his men that their battalion was merely a labour unit.’(12) If Carter knew his battalion was not merely a labour unit, it was a more difficult task defining what their exact role would be. 

Structure

The battalion’s structure most closely resembled an infantry battalion, with 1,000 men divided between four companies and a Lewis–gun section that could cover working parties or as anti–aircraft guards.(13) Despite being structured as an infantry battalion, pioneer battalions were full of many men with engineering and trade skills. When raised in Egypt in February/March 1916, pioneer battalions almost exclusively looked for skilled tradesmen to fill the ranks. In the 5th Australian Pioneer Battalion, 20 men came from Lance Corporal William Raven’s infantry battalion, many of whom were ‘their best men’, given up because only ‘mechanics, miners and skilled labourers were wanted’ for the pioneer unit.(14) 

Raven’s section was composed of ‘trained miners’, two who had worked in Wales, three in Newcastle (New South Wales) and one from Broken Hill, assigned the ‘dangerous work’ of ‘sapping, tunnelling under the enemies’ trenches’.(15) Brigade commanders were required to provide a company comprised of a specified number of tradesmen, with the balance being ‘pick and shovel’ men. Commanding officers were also handicapped by infantry commanders deliberately selecting ‘an undue proportion of bad characters’ for these new units to remove them from their own.(16)

The composition of the pioneer units made them a useful engineering asset to the CRE and could be used to increase the division’s engineering output. According to an Army Council Instruction from January 1915, pioneers were to engage in straightforward tasks such as road–making, demolition and entrenching, as well more complex tasks such as technical work on railway embankments, to be able to construct wire obstacles and to bridge and to fell trees.(17) The perceived benefit was their ability to relieve infantry battalions of fatigue and construction work, allowing the units that held the line to rest for more extended periods.(18) However, for Carter, their specific role as engineers was initially an implied tasking, rather than an explicit one. After the war, Carter recalled that: ‘Apart from the fact of the large percentage of skilled tradesmen, there was no other indication or other information available as to exactly what was the role of the Pioneer Battalions.’(19) This problem persisted until the division reached the Western Front, and the battalion fitted into whatever role was required. 

Bellecourt 1918

It had been a hallmark of Carter’s early months in command that he laid sound training and discipline as the foundation of his unit, engaging in sub–unit and battalion manoeuvres while in Egypt.(20) For Carter, this was not an alien task, given his pre–war militia training and his service in the 1st Australian Infantry Battalion. Throughout its lifetime, the battalion was kept at ‘the highest possible standard of efficiency’ with regards to its infantry role, through training ‘almost exactly similar to infantry training’.(21) Despite this, Australian divisions rarely used their pioneer battalions as infantry, prompting complaints from the men that their lives were ‘all take and no give’.(22) They were more than happy to exact retribution upon the Germans and be used as combat troops. In preparation for a move southwards in March 1918, Carter ordered his men to sharpen their bayonets and remarked: ‘It would have afforded a good deal of thought to a philosopher to have seen the enthusiasm and meticulous care with which that order was carried out.’(23) The only real opportunity for Carter’s men to engage in ‘actual fighting’ was at Bellicourt in September 1918.(24) The unit historian considers this one of the battalion’s ‘happiest recollections’, as the time spent perfecting its infantry training enabled it to play a large part in the capture of the town.(25) 

For that operation the battalion was tasked with ‘making good certain roads leading from the original front lines to the village of Bellicourt, as soon as possible after the general advance’ – a typical pioneer battalion task.(26) Their orders did not mention engaging the enemy.(27) Carter recalled:

‘The morning turned out exceedingly thick fog, and the advance was not as rapid as was expected, with the result that the more forward working parties found themselves among the German lines. There was accordingly no alternative but to “down tools”. One part of the nett [sic] result being the capture of six German officers, and 201 prisoners.’(28) 

The 5th Australian Pioneer Battalion was working in conjunction with the 105th US Engineer Regiment on two roads to the right of the advance. The advancing infantry had not completely mopped–up the captured area (probably due to the thick fog), and there were pockets of resistance, including a German anti–tank gun crew. A D Ellis, the historian of the 5th Australian Division, wrote: ‘Amazed but not daunted by this, the pioneers threw away their shovels and set lustily to work with rifle and bayonet – an employment not less congenial, and equally well understood’.(29) The pioneers assaulted the anti–tank gun crew and seized a machine–gun post with about 50 prisoners and the machine–gun itself.(30) The pioneers formed a defensive flank north of Bellicourt village and captured six officers and 154 other ranks. Ellis wrote: ‘As may be expected, the pioneers suffered considerable losses, seven officers and 57 other ranks becoming casualties, but the work accomplished in practically clearing Bellicourt of enemy garrisons was of great value to the operations as a whole and much facilitated that of the other troops’.(31) 

Having completed their primary task to construct roads as well as the additional combat, the 5th Australian Pioneer Battalion withdrew from the front line that night. Ellis suggested that Carter and his adjutant ‘must have felt amply recompensed for all the plans they had taken to maintain the Battalion as an efficient fighting unit, even though its work was usually road and trench construction.’(32) Although Ellis seems certain, the conclusion that the pioneers’ division of labour was justified is less than clear.

Instances such as at Bellicourt were infrequent. Primarily, pioneer battalions functioned in a support role, more closely resembling the work of other engineering units. For most of the 5th Australian Division’s major engagements, the pioneer battalion functioned as engineers. At Polygon Wood on 26 September 1917, the 5th Australian Pioneer Battalion and the 8th Australian Field Company were kept in reserve while the 14th and 15th Australian Field Companies engaged in forward work.(33) At Morlancourt on 28/29 July 1918, the battalion was allotted to dig communication trenches from the front line to the captured position on the blue line but did not engage the enemy.(34) 

Engineer

Regardless of the provisions made for the battalion to have a combat capability, its main role was in engineering. Their work was almost entirely in the fighting zones, primarily employed on communication works either in, or immediately behind, the front lines, including that on trenches, duck–boards, light railways, roads and small bridges.(35) Engineering field companies and other specialist units tended to work on heavier engineering tasks, although this began to change by the end of the war.(36) Before an operation, pioneers could work on:

‘...trenches, roads, assembly parallels, gun emplacements; and during attack, consolidation and the construction and manning of supporting strong–points and the re–establishment of forward communications by road and trench. Large numbers of men were then, as always, absorbed by carrying parties for material, ammunition and bombs beyond the point to which transport could proceed.’(37) 

Such work freed up infantrymen for their proper combat role. During large operations pioneers could be withdrawn from their detached role to be consolidated under the battalion commander, conserving their manpower for ‘large undertakings, and concentration at short notice on emergency works, or for a reserve in the hands of the Divisional Commander’.(38) 

Given their heavy use as engineers, appointing officers with engineering experience to command pioneer battalions was beneficial. This approach seemed to differ from the practice in the British Army, which largely selected COs with non–engineering backgrounds. The lack of technical expertise in engineering might have been the reason that historian K W Mitchinson argued that a pioneer CO was ‘more of an administrative and organisational figurehead than a decider of destinies.’(39) He also commented that a pioneer battalion CO ‘only had limited control over the day to day work of his battalion’.(40) The AIF was different, as most pioneer COs did have previous engineering experience and thus could contribute to the engineering work of the battalion. Such was the case with Carter, who was an excellent engineer and was thus well–qualified to hold his command. ‘This B[attalio]n will call for my engineering talent to some degree & is therefore very congenial’, he remarked upon hearing of his appointment.(41) 

As a professional engineer, Carter was not only efficient at his trade, but he also enjoyed it. Carter described the German retreat to the Hindenburg Line in early 1917 was ‘certainly the most interesting part of the war’ he had experienced thus far. The battalion engaged in a lot of road work. ‘I rather like it’, he wrote, ‘our last job is quite as good as anything I’ve seen round these parts, although I say so.’(42) He understood the nature of military engineering, specifically the time demands placed on engineers.(43) He also saw operations with an engineer’s eye. In the face of the German retreat at the start of 1917, Carter surmised that the German objective was ‘to weaken our offensive power by leaving us in an inferior position as regards Roads, Railways, Billets, Water Supply and Communications generally. It is our work as a Pioneer Battalion to see that this object is defeated.’(44) 

He engaged in the work of his battalion. When the unit constructed a mile of trench tramway over three nights in July 1916, he described it as his ‘piece de resistance’. He had surveyed the line ‘over ditches & trenches, banks & hedges’ and did not have a night’s rest for a week.(45) When he was awarded the DSO in January 1918, his citation paid tribute to his supervision and organisation and being ‘most conscientious and painstaking’ in his work.(46) Like good infantry COs, he owned the work that his battalion did: if they succeeded, he received the praise, and if they failed, he would take the blame. In December 1916 he was constructing trenches in poor weather. ‘We could have done this if the weather had held,’ he remarked, ‘but by falling in the trenches become impassable & it’s the devil’s own job to get them clear – an impassable trench is worth nothing, so my reputation is going to rest largely on the weather – no allowances are made in the army.’(47) 

Given his professional competence as an engineer, he was able to develop his officers well: ‘A good battalion commander was a good teacher,’ noted historian Patrick Brennan.(48) At this, Carter was proficient. Early in his command, he noted that his officers were ‘mostly young & want a lot of teaching.’ He selected most of them himself, and remarked ‘so only have myself to blame dora deficiencies.’He did manage to find three sappers who each had a Bachelor of Education from the University of Sydney and got them commissions.(49) He was responsible for constructing a light railway in March 1917 with a staff that was ‘mostly inexperienced in the work’, requiring Carter to ‘teach everyone his job.’(50) 

Learning Process

Command was a learning process for Carter too. In November 1916, Carter remarked that he was ‘beginning to feel [his] feet’ as a lieutenant colonel in command of a battalion.(51) This task was made harder by the fact that commanding a pioneer battalion was a new challenge; pioneer COs were commanding units that had no clear function and were not consolidated together with great frequency. Carter, in command of the battalion for its entire history, evidently managed the task of finding the pioneers’ niche within a complex army and an immense war. As with other battalion commanders, his time as CO was a highlight of his military career. In the preface to the battalion’s published unit history, Carter wrote: ‘To command a battalion of Australians, who could work as well as fight, for three years was a great privilege and a great trust.’(52) 

He returned to Australia after the war and recommenced his work at the Department of Public Works. By 1924 he was its chief electrical engineer, yet in 1929 he resigned from the public service to enter the private sector. He was a longstanding council member of the Institution of Engineers, Australia (from 1924 to 1948) and was the president in 1943. Retiring after a successful career, he died suddenly on 11 July 1963 aged 78.(53)

Dr William Westerman completed his PhD at the School of Humanities and Social Sciences at the University of New South Wales (Canberra), researching Australian infantry battalion commanders in the Great War. He has published a number of books, book chapters and scholarly articles on aspects of the war, including Soldiers and Gentlemen: Australian Battalion Commanders in the Great War 1914–1918 and The Battle of Broodseinde Ridge 1917. He has worked at Monash University, Melbourne, and as an ANU Teaching Fellow at the Australian Command and Staff College. Before being appointed as a co–author of the second volume on Australian peacekeeping operations in East Timor 2000–2012, he worked as a researcher for the volume on Australian Operations in Afghanistan 2010–2014. 

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