How Far was the Shells Crisis of 1915 Exploited by David Lloyd George for his own Political Gain?

[This article is by 17-year old Jack Moyse and is based on his essay which was the runner-up for the Colin Hardy Memorial Prize. Jack is still (in 2021) a pupil at Portsmouth Grammar School.]

There is no doubt that a national crisis like a war, or a pandemic like the ongoing COVID-19 outbreak, places immense pressure on politicians to perform and deliver for the country. These crises are the greatest test for all politicians, and they either threaten to tarnish their reputation permanently, or they promise to earn them an undying stature and prestige. Winston Churchill was typically defined by his response to the national crisis of the Second World War, emerging as Britain’s finest leader during her darkest hour. However, David Lloyd George’s reputation arising from the national emergency of the Great War was less clear cut, his role in the war remaining a hotly disputed topic to this day.  A critical test which helped define Lloyd George as a wartime leader was the Shells Crisis of 1915.

To understand Lloyd George’s true motivations during the Shells Crisis it is necessary to explore the impact of the Crisis on the British political landscape, industrial labour supply and the risk to Lloyd George’s reputation as a statesman. While he emerged well from the Crisis on a personal level, to what extent did he subordinate personal ambition and political advantage to acting in the country’s best wartime interests?

Artillery shells were vital to the war on the Western Front. By summer 1916, the army was recording a weekly shell consumption level of 800,000^[1]. These high demands were caused by the nature of trench warfare on the Western Front, which generated a greater requirement for shells. However, in May 1915 the British munitions industry could sustain only a monthly output of just 70,000 shells.^[2]. Traditionally, the British army preferred to use shrapnel shells over high explosive shells, expecting anti-personnel weapons to be useful in trench warfare. However, it was soon clear that shrapnel shells would be used less for killing entrenched enemy forces and more for destroying field defences and fortifications.^[3] These fortifications included barbed wire entanglements which prevented armies advancing across battlefields. Hence, British forces needed to destroy German defences and this had to be done with shells. Whilst ideal as anti-personnel weapons, shrapnel was ineffective in cutting barbed wire and destroying fortifications, and more high-explosive shells were now needed.  Consequently, without sufficient high-explosive shells British infantry suffered disastrous defeats, like in the Battle of Aubers Ridge on 9 May 1915. In this battle, the British forces had limited shell supplies and could only manage a 40-minute artillery bombardment of shrapnel shells, failing to cut the barbed wire defences and thus leaving British soldiers to be cut down in No Man’s Land^[4].

Lloyd George recognised the problem, claiming ‘this is an artillery war. We must have every gun we can lay hands on’^[5] when discussing the costs of supplying munitions and shells. To achieve this aim, however, he recognised the need to change the political landscape. Ardent in advocating coalition politics, the Shells Crisis gave Lloyd George the perfect opportunity to engineer a political truce as a backdrop to a political investigation into the shell shortages. By May 1915, Conservative backbenchers were pressurising their leader, Bonar Law, to take advantage and coerce the government into collapsing.^[6]Despite Bonar Law’s fears about acting on these pleas, Lloyd George was vocal in discussions with him and encouraged him to support a coalition. Lloyd George’s manoeuvres included hosting Bonar Law at the Treasury on 17th May where the need for a coalition was mutually agreed. He also proposed this to H. Asquith, the Prime Minister, in a meeting where the issue was sorted in ‘less than a quarter of an hour.’^[7] Although Asquith was tempted to resist the Conservative threat with his Irish Nationalist-Labour allies in parliament, Lloyd George’s scheming and role as a ‘go-between’^[8] advanced his stance. Lloyd George also made no attempt to hide his rejection of Asquith’s Liberal government, saying to Asquith he was ‘unable to go on’ and that ‘the situation is impossible.’^[9] Consequently, with the opportunity the Shells Crisis provided, Lloyd George successfully created a base which diluted the influence of each party in the coalition, with the Liberals conceding their full control and the Conservatives, despite joining the coalition, remaining unthreatening and unpopular. This structure meant that party partisanship broke down, enabling Lloyd George, with his more fluid views and dislike for party politics, to thrive as an indispensable and prominent coalition leader. It seems evident, therefore, that Lloyd George used the Shells Crisis as a device to shape a political landscape which would suit him best.

The new landscape, of course, gave Lloyd George the unmissable opportunity to form his own ministry, having already greatly familiarised himself with the subject of munitions. In October 1914, a munitions committee was formed in which Lloyd George participated, travelling to France to assess French munitions logistics. During this trip, Lloyd George liaised with General Sainte-Claire Deville, the French Army artillery expert, and learned ‘anything he wanted to know’^[10] about munitions. Hence, Lloyd George felt ready to apply his knowledge to the war effort and, simultaneously, showcase his quality as a man of action in the government. Because of the Shells Crisis, Lloyd George saw his chance to prompt a cabinet reshuffle and to assume a new role in munitions as the head of the newly formed Ministry of Munitions. In crafting himself as an indispensable member of government, with a possible eye on the post of Prime Minister, he made a point of not crediting Lord Kitchener, the Secretary of State for War, whose earlier measures had already started the process of increasing British munitions output. Lloyd George was clearly determined to resolve the Shells Crisis but was also acutely aware of his own political advantage.

Nevertheless, Lloyd George did accept political and reputational risks in the formation of the Ministry of Munitions. He was by no means assured of success in dealing with the Shells Crisis. The situation in May 1915 was very discouraging and alarming, the lack of high explosive shells resulting in heavy British losses at the Battles of Aubers Ridge and Festubert.^[11]Lloyd George had now assumed all responsibility for any shortcomings in shell production, making him susceptible to a share of the blame for any failed military operations in the future, regardless of whether the supply of shells was an issue. Hence, with the formation of the coalition, Lloyd George exposed himself to a precarious situation and gave himself no margin for error in resolving the crisis. Furthermore, by transferring to the untried and new Ministry of Munitions, he was arguably demoting himself from the role of Chancellor.  Establishing the new ministry was itself a considerable challenge, Lloyd George claiming that the newly found ministry ‘had a greater struggle over getting a carpet than over getting 50 millions for munitions.’^[12] In this regard, it seems that Lloyd George was not entirely politically self-motivated, nor seeking purely personal gain, but truly recognised the country’s needs.

Neither was the political impact of the crisis intentionally exploited by Lloyd George in terms of weakening the Prime Minister, Asquith, and seeking to replace him at that point. Indeed, Lloyd George had a sustained positive outlook on Asquith. In October 1914, whilst talking to his close friend, Sir George Riddell, he described Asquith as ‘a very strong man,’^[13] and in November, even when the realities of the war had set in and shell shortages had emerged, he reported that Asquith was ‘as strong as a horse.’^[14] These comments suggest that, initially, Lloyd George was a supporter of Asquith and trusted him on war policy. As a result, it is unlikely that Lloyd George viewed the Shells Crisis as an opportunity to pounce and profit at the expense of Asquith.  The cabinet reshuffle and formation of the coalition was restrained, keeping Asquith in the premiership with a Liberal-dominated cabinet, albeit with some Conservative influence. Asquith also had an increasingly improved view of Lloyd George and acknowledged his good intentions, writing in a private letter to Lloyd George ‘I shall never forget your devotion, your unselfishness, your powers of resource… your self-forgetfulness.’^[15] There is little to suggest at this juncture that Lloyd George sought to bring Asquith down or to exploit the crisis for personal political gain.

Lloyd George’s methods in overhauling munitions production highlighted his focus on the task in hand. At the outbreak of the war, there was no protection for workers vital to supplying the British Army with shells, for military recruitment was indiscriminate in enlisting anyone for the war effort, whether or not they were better deployed in civilian employment. With this recruitment system or lack thereof, key industries were drained of their workers and were overstretched as British offensives failed on the Western Front. By July 1915, these industries had lost a third of their workers to enlistment,^[16] and a Board of Trade report revealed that the vital industries of coal and engineering suffered the most, losing 21.8% and 19.5% of their workforce respectively^[17]. Lloyd George, as Minister of Munitions, was tasked with reversing this and implementing a better system to secure protection for vital workers from enlistment.  He did this through a centralised badging^[18] system. Section 8 of the Munitions of War Act 1915^[19] made the duty of badging exclusive to the Ministry of Munitions, having the sole power to issue and prohibit badges^[20]. This system meant that vital industries would not lose as many workers to military recruitment, ensuring that everyone’s value to the war was maximised in the most appropriate field, where everyone, according to Lord Lansdowne, had ‘not merely a part in the national task, but the part which he is best qualified to undertake.’^[21] Hence, with Lloyd George’s successes in protecting workers from recruitment, the strain on industries was alleviated, and war production improved.

In rising to the challenge, moreover, Lloyd George took on further political risks.  Even with the new badging system, bitter stalemates emerged between the Ministry of Munitions and recruiting officers over enlistment, with many recruiting officers tending to ignore these new controls on recruitment. In autumn 1915 under the Derby Scheme, badged and starred workers were still vulnerable to enlistment; they could still be attested, and there was still significant authority bestowed on Appeals Tribunals^[22]. Hence, despite Lloyd George’s efforts, critical industries were still vulnerable to being drained of their workforce. At the risk of further angering recruiting bodies and public opinion, he took on the duty of further reinforcing protection for workers. He delivered a poster broadcast in November 1915 which stated, ‘no men officially badged or starred for munitions work may be enlisted for immediate service.’^[23]Lloyd George proved resolute in upholding his policies on badged workers, willingly risking his reputation to resolve the Shells Crisis.

Arguably, however, Lloyd George became too fixated on the issue of worker protection, which came at the expense of the strength of the British forces on the frontline. By mid-1916, labour shortages in critical industries were almost non-existent, which reflected great credit on Lloyd George. However, from a report involving 12,000 badged firms in 1916, 2,112,896 men were employed in badged work yet, of these, just 698,587 were skilled workers and 1,118,767 were fit for military service.^[24] Consequently, Lloyd George inflicted shortages upon the War Office, leaving British forces on the frontline exposed and lacking manpower. It was at this time, following the resolution of the Shells Crisis, that Lloyd George more clearly demonstrated that his personal ambition was entangled with his perception of the national interest, content to sacrifice efforts elsewhere if he gained personally. However, there had been signs of this in the latter part of 1915.

During the second half of 1915, Lloyd George was prepared to exploit the labour protection system to engineer the introduction of conscription. During his tenure at the Ministry of Munitions, he had lost faith in the voluntary enlistment system. Accepting that the war would be longer than expected, he saw conscription as a ‘military necessity’^[25]. The National Registration Act of July 1915 seemed to support Lloyd George’s views.  The Act required a census to be carried out that required all adults between 15 and 65 years of age to register themselves ‘in the manner provided by this Act’^[26], including a statement of their occupation. Although initially intended for the debate over munitions, the registration, with other reports under the Derby scheme, revealed damning figures on enlistment. In December 1915, it was reported that over 800,000 men were willingly available for military service, yet this was much lower than the anticipated 1.5 million. Moreover, the reports showed that 1,029,231 unmarried and fit men were yet to offer themselves for enlistment^[27]. On the one hand, this seemed to justify Lloyd George’s methods in protecting workers when other men were available for enlistment and exposed the inefficiency of voluntaryism. At the same time, Lloyd George did not take full advantage of the availability of potential women workers to free men for enlistment. Despite welcoming munitionettes^[28]into factory work to tackle the Shells Crisis, Lloyd George made little effort to appeal actively to women to join and took no action to improve the appalling factory conditions for women. These awful working conditions were summarised by Seebohm Rowntree, who knew a foreman in a factory who said that ‘he would rather his daughter went to hell direct than through that factory.’^[29]Consequently, Lloyd George ensured that many men had to be retained in the munitions industry and that military enlistment would need to rely on conscription. Hence, he achieved his goal by duly helping to convince Asquith to adopt conscription as the only viable option left.

No matter the extent of Lloyd George’s self-interest, from May 1915 to July 1916 monthly shell production increased from 70,000 to over a million, and machine gun production rose from 6,000 in 1915 to 80,000 in 1918^[30]. This was a tremendous achievement and from mid-1916 the British Army on the Western Front no longer suffered a shortage of shells. Lloyd George’s stint at the Ministry of Munitions certainly commanded recognition from important individuals in the war effort. Viscount Milner lauded him as ‘the greatest War Minister since Chatham.’^[31] Praise also came from Sir George Riddell, the newspaper businessman, who recognised Lloyd George’s expertise in solving the Shells Crisis, noting his ‘courage, daring, patience, bravery in the face of personal danger and responsibility.’^[32] Consequently, this widespread support meant that Lloyd George’s status and value naturally made him the most suitable candidate for higher posts, including the premiership. This recognition no doubt bolstered Lloyd George’s political ambitions, but it was a consequence of his sincere initial aim of solving the Shells Crisis, at considerable risk to his political reputation.

Lloyd George’s political reputation was largely based on his radical political outlook. Before the war, as Chancellor of the Exchequer, he had set out an unprecedented scheme of social reform. These Liberal reforms included the Old Age Pensions Act 1908, which granted 25p a week to those aged over 70 on low incomes, and the National Insurance Act 1911, which covered 3 million workers against sickness and unemployment.^[33] Hence, Lloyd George was traditionally mindful and sympathetic to the hardships of the working class, giving him a radical reputation. Additionally, given his humble background, Lloyd George shared great bonds of affection with the working class as he claimed to be ‘a man of the people, bred amongst them’ and spoke of ‘fighting the battles of class.’^[34] Therefore, when tasked with maximising shell production, Lloyd George had conflicting interests between maintaining cordial relations with munitions workers whilst getting them to produce as many shells as possible. Ultimately, Lloyd George, as Minister of Munitions, sacrificed workers’ rights and limited their freedoms by engineering the passing of the Munitions of War Act 1915. The first clause detailed the ‘prohibition of strikes and lockouts ... in any work connected with the supply of munitions’, and the Act extended the Government’s’ powers by ‘restricting workmen from leaving Government work without good cause.’^[35] Consequently, Lloyd George’s determination in tackling the Shells Crisis compromised his radicalism and previously cordial relations with the working class.  His restriction of workers’ rights generated hostility; with many workers feeling that Lloyd George had failed to appreciate that they were unfairly bearing the brunt of the industrial effort in support of the war. In this respect, Lloyd George was prepared to put his hard-won political reputation as a radical man of the people on the line.

In conclusion, David Lloyd George did not intentionally or single-mindedly exploit the Shells Crisis for his own political gain, no matter how well he emerged from it. No one could deny the increased supply of munitions to the British Army. While always aware of any political advantage to be gained, he prioritised the actions necessary in the national interest, and it was fortuitous that these actions matched his political preferences and ambitions. He attracted widespread praise and recognition for the political risks he took and the painful prioritisation of the war effort, Asquith himself noting Lloyd George’s ‘incalculable help and support I have found in you all through.’^[36] Whilst Lloyd George certainly encouraged the breakdown in party politics that resulted in the coalition by highlighting inadequate munitions production, his prime aim was the most effective government possible, continuing under Asquith. He also used the retention of his munitions workers to engineer the policy of conscription, but in doing so prioritised the national interest first and foremost, and in this wider sense the Shells Crisis contributed to Lloyd George’s reputation as ‘the man who won the war.’  It would only be later that his controversial personality would have a questionable impact on the conduct of the war.

Sources

Primary sources:

1. The draft bill of the Munitions of War Act 1915. Accessed via the National Archives with reference: CAB 37/130/11 with the link file://C:/Users/pompe/Downloads/CAB-37-130-11%20(1).pdf
2. The draft bill of the National Registration 1915. Accessed via the National Archives with reference: CAB 37/129/8 via the link file:///C:/Users/pompe/Downloads/CAB-37-129-8.pdf
3. Copies of the cabinet papers, which refer to the National Registration in 1915. Accessed via the National Archives with reference: CAB 37/129/36 via the link file:///C:/Users/pompe/Downloads/CAB-37-129-36.pdf
4. Copies of cabinet papers, which discuss issues of manpower and conscription. Accessed via the National Archives with reference: CAB 37/134/5 via the link file:///C:/Users/pompe/AppData/Local/Packages/Microsoft.MicrosoftEdge_8wekyb3d8bbwe/TempState/Downloads/CAB-37-134-5%20(1).pdf

Secondary sources:

1. Grigg, John. “Lloyd George. From Peace to War 1912-1916.” The Penguin Group. 1985.
2. Pugh, Martin. “Lloyd George.” Longman Group UK Ltd. 1988.
3. Lynch, Michael. “Lloyd George and the Liberal Dilemma.” Hodder and Stoughton Ltd, 1993.
4. Searle, Geoffrey Russell. “The Liberal Party Triumph and Disintegration, 1886-1929.” The Macmillan Press Ltd, 1992.
5. Strachan, Hew. “The First World War: Volume I: To Arms” Oxford University Press. 2003.
6. Wolfe, Humbert. ‘Labour Supply and Regulation.’ Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1923. Accessed via: https://ia802700.us.archive.org/26/items/laboursupplyregu00wolfuoft/laboursupplyregu00wolfuoft.pdf
7. Riddell, George. “The Riddell Diaries 1908-1923.” The Athlone Press. 1986.
8. Rowland, Peter. ‘David Lloyd George, a biography.’ The Macmillan Press Ltd, 1976.
9. Jones, Thomas. “Lloyd George.” The Oxford University Press. 1951.
10. Gordon, John. ‘H. H. Asquith and Britain's Manpower Problem, 1914–1915.’ Wiley. Accessed via JStor: https://www.jstor.org/stable/24423466
11. Fraser, Peter. “British War Policy and the Crisis of Liberalism in May 1915.” The University of Chicago Press. 1982. Accessed via JStor: https://www.jstor.org/stable/1906048
12. Krisztina, Robert. “Constructions of Home Front and Women’s Military Employment in the First World War Britain.” Wiley. Accessed via JStor: https://www.jstor.org/stable/24542989
13. Article on the Battle of Aubers Ridge: https://www.longlongtrail.co.uk/battles/battles-of-the-western-front-in-france-and-flanders/the-battle-of-aubers/

^[1]Figure cited from: Strachan, Hew: “The First World War. To arms, volume 1.” Oxford 2001: Oxford University Press. Page 1048

^[2] Figure obtained from Pugh’s biography: Pugh, Martin. “Lloyd George.” War and Peace, 1908-1916 (Munitions and Strategy). Longman Group UK Ltd. 1988. Page 87

^[3]Information gathered from: Strachan, Hew: Shells Crisis of 1915,in 1914-1918-online. International Encyclopedia of the First World War.

^[4]Information from: https://www.longlongtrail.co.uk/battles/battles-of-the-western-front-in-france-and-flanders/the-battle-of-aubers/

^[5]Quotation by Lloyd George. Cited from: “The Riddell Diaries 1908-1923.” The Athlone Press. 1986. Page 92

^[6]Information gathered from: Gordon, John. ‘H. H. Asquith and Britain's Manpower Problem, 1914–1915.’ Wiley, Page 403. Accessed via JStor: https://www.jstor.org/stable/24423466

^[7]These were Lloyd George’s own words. Quotation cited from: Pugh, Martin. “Lloyd George.” War and Peace, 1908-1916 (Munitions and Strategy). Longman Group UK Ltd. 1988. Page 85

^[8]Pugh’s words of Lloyd George’s role in the formation of the coalition: Pugh, Martin. “Lloyd George.” War and Peace, 1908-1916 (Munitions and Strategy). Longman Group UK Ltd. 1988. Page 85

^[9]Quotations by Lloyd George in Griggs’ biography: Grigg, John. “Lloyd George. From Peace to War 1912-1916.” New Government, New Job. The Penguin Group. 1985. Page 248-249

^[10]Quotation from John Grigg in his biography: Grigg, John. “Lloyd George. From Peace to War 1912-1916.” Coming to Grips with the War. The Penguin Group. 1985. Page 180

^[11]Information from: https://www.longlongtrail.co.uk/battles/battles-of-the-western-front-in-france-and-flanders/the-battle-of-aubers/

^[12]Quotation from Lloyd George. Cited from: Grigg, John. “Lloyd George. From Peace to War 1912-1916.” ‘The Heaviest Burden’. The Penguin Group. 1985. Page 257

^[13]Quotation from John Grigg in his biography: Grigg, John. “Lloyd George. From Peace to War 1912-1916.” New Government, New Job. The Penguin Group. 1985. Page 245

^[14]Quotation from John Grigg in his biography: Grigg, John. “Lloyd George. From Peace to War 1912-1916.” New Government, New Job. The Penguin Group. 1985. Page 245

^[15]An excerpt from a letter from Asquith to Lloyd George on 25th May 1915 (days after the formation of the coalition. Cited from: Grigg, John. “Lloyd George. From Peace to War 1912-1916.” New Government, New Job. The Penguin Group. 1985. Page 255

^[16]Information gathered from: Gordon, John. ‘H. H. Asquith and Britain's Manpower Problem, 1914–1915.’ Wiley, Page 401. Accessed via JStor: https://www.jstor.org/stable/24423466

^[17]Information gathered from: Wolfe, Humbert. ‘Labour Supply and Regulation.’ Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1923. Page 14. Accessed via: https://ia802700.us.archive.org/26/items/laboursupplyregu00wolfuoft/laboursupplyregu00wolfuoft.pdf

^[18]Badges were pin badges worn by civilians during the war to indicate that they were employed in a vital industry to the war

^[19]References to the Munitions of War Act 1915. Cited from: Wolfe, Humbert. ‘Labour Supply and Regulation.’ Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1923. Page 318. Accessed via: https://ia802700.us.archive.org/26/items/laboursupplyregu00wolfuoft/laboursupplyregu00wolfuoft.pdf

^[20]References to the Munitions of War Act 1915. Cited from: Wolfe, Humbert. ‘Labour Supply and Regulation.’ Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1923. Page 318. Accessed via: https://ia802700.us.archive.org/26/items/laboursupplyregu00wolfuoft/laboursupplyregu00wolfuoft.pdf

^[21]Quotation attributed to Lord Lansdowne. Cited from: Wolfe, Humbert. ‘Labour Supply and Regulation.’ Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1923. Page 29. Accessed via: https://ia802700.us.archive.org/26/items/laboursupplyregu00wolfuoft/laboursupplyregu00wolfuoft.pdf

^[22]Information on the Derby scheme and enlistment in late 1915 was gathered from: Wolfe, Humbert. ‘Labour Supply and Regulation.’ Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1923. Page 35. Accessed via: https://ia802700.us.archive.org/26/items/laboursupplyregu00wolfuoft/laboursupplyregu00wolfuoft.pdf

^[23]A poster broadcast from Lloyd George in 1915. Cited from: Wolfe, Humbert. ‘Labour Supply and Regulation.’ Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1923. Page 36. Via: https://ia802700.us.archive.org/26/items/laboursupplyregu00wolfuoft/laboursupplyregu00wolfuoft.pdf

^[24]Information and figures attributed to: Wolfe, Humbert. ‘Labour Supply and Regulation.’ Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1923. Page 37. Accessed via: https://ia802700.us.archive.org/26/items/laboursupplyregu00wolfuoft/laboursupplyregu00wolfuoft.pdf

^[25]Information attributed to: Grigg, John. “Lloyd George. From Peace to War 1912-1916.” Tormented Government. The Penguin Group. 1985. Page 327

^[26]Direct Quotation from the draft bill of the National Registration 1915. Accessed via the National Archives with ref. CAB 37/129/8 via file:///C:/Users/pompe/Downloads/CAB-37-129-8.pdf

^[27]Information and figures attributed to: Wolfe, Humbert. ‘Labour Supply and Regulation.’ Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1923. Page 36. Accessed via: https://ia802700.us.archive.org/26/items/laboursupplyregu00wolfuoft/laboursupplyregu00wolfuoft.pdf

^[28]Munitionettes were British women who worked in munitions factories during the war to help solve the shell crisis

^[29]Quotation by Seebohm Rowntree in November 1915. Cited from: Grigg, John. 'Lloyd George. From Peace to War 1912-1916.' ‘The Heaviest Burden.’ The Penguin Group. 1985. Page 302

^[30]Figure obtained from Pugh’s biography: Pugh, Martin. “Lloyd George.” War and Peace, 1908-1916 (Munitions and Strategy). Longman Group UK Ltd. 1988. Page 87

^[31]Quotation by Alfred Milner, 1st Viscount Milner. Cited from: Jones, Thomas. “Lloyd George.” The Oxford University Press. 1951. Page 283. Milner’s mention of Chatham is referring to the 18th century British statesman William Pitt the Elder.

^[32]Quotation by George Riddell, 1st Baron Riddell. Cited from: 'The Riddell Diaries 1908-1923.' The Athlone Press. 1986. Page 194

^[33]Information cited from: Lynch, Michael. 'Lloyd George and the Liberal Dilemma.' Lloyd George and the Liberal Reforms, 1906-1911. Hodder and Stoughton Ltd, 1993. Pages 43-50

^[34]The quotations are from Lloyd George during a speech in Manchester in 1908. Rowland, Peter. ‘David Lloyd George, a biography.’ The Macmillan Press Ltd, 1976. Page 51

^[35]Direct Quotation from the draft bill of the Munitions of War Act 1915. Accessed via the National Archives with ref. CAB 37/130/11 via file://C:/Users/pompe/Downloads/CAB-37-130-11%20(1).pdf 

^[36]An excerpt from a letter from Asquith to Lloyd George on 25th May 1915 (days after the formation of the coalition. Cited from: Grigg, John. Lloyd George. From Peace to War 1912-1916.' New Government, New Job. The Penguin Group. 1985. Page 255